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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa is characterised by its high and persistent level of unemployment, in particular 
among the youth. The high youth unemployment is attributed to various reasons, ranging 
from their lack of work experience, skills mismatch to employment and wage rigidities. The 
South African government proposed the youth wage subsidy to be implemented in 2011, with 
the primary aim of solving the youth unemployment problem. This study starts by providing a 
literature review on the youth labour market trends since the transition; it emerged that there 
is a lack of studies focusing exclusively on how youths fare in the labour market. Next, the 
demographic and educational attainment characteristics of the youth narrow labour force, 
employed and narrow unemployed are analysed under the narrow or strict definition, using 
the 1995-1999 October Household Surveys (OHSs), the 2000-2007 Labour Force Surveys 
(LFSs) and the 2008-2011 Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFSs). With regard to 
unemployed youths, it is found that they are more likely to be blacks, without Matric and have 
never worked before. The main causes of youth unemployment are then discussed in detail, 
before the thesis moves on to examine the various active and passive labour market policies 
that could help to address the youth unemployment problem. The possible pros and cons of 
the youth wage subsidy, one of the active policies and the focus of this study, are discussed in 
greater detail. In particular, the claim by institutions such as COSATU that the introduction of 
the subsidy would lead to elderly workers (who are not subsidised) being replaced by the 
youth workers (who are subsidised) is not entirely correct, as these two groups of workers 
could be complementary instead of substitutes, and the introduction of the subsidy 
programme could result in an increase of demand for both elderly and youth workers. It is 
concluded that, although the youth wage subsidy could be one of the feasible solutions to 
stimulate demand for youth labour, it is not sufficient to address youth unemployment. It 
needs to be complemented by the other policies, such as a job search subsidy (targeting 
discouraged work seekers) and public employment programmes (e.g. Expanded Public Works 
Programme); but it is most important to note that these policies could only be fully effective if 
the root causes of youth unemployment are addressed by the government.  
 
KEYWORDS: Youth unemployment, labour force, youth, youth wage subsidy, labour 
market, labour force participation, unemployment, age cohort, South Africa  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The persistently high level of unemployment has always been one of the biggest problems 
facing the South African economy since the political transition in 1994. The unemployment 
rate of the country is mainly a structural issue, as there is a mismatch between skills 
demanded by the employers and skills supplied by the labour force (Yu 2012:1). This occurs 
as a result of the increased demand for highly skilled workers because of the increased use of 
technologically advanced methods of production, while there is an over-supply in the 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour force. 
 
Unemployment is much more serious amongst the youth, as indicated by the fact that they are 
associated with a much lower probability of employment compared with adults. Even if the 
youths are employed, they are more likely to be retrenched first during periods of economic 
distress, because of their relatively low level of experience. The South African government 
has been implementing various economic policies since the transition, with one of the major 
goals of these policies being the reduction of unemployment and job creation. These policies 
include the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP
1
), the Growth, Employment 
and Reconstruction (GEAR
2
) policy, the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South 
Africa (ASGISA
3
) and the New Growth Path.
4
 However, unemployment rates are still high, 
especially among the youth. 
 
In order to deal with the youth unemployment problem, policy makers suggested the 
introduction of the youth wage subsidy in 2011 to increase the employers’ incentive to 
employ young people (National Treasury 2011). The subsidy was initially supposed to be 
implemented at the start of the 2012 fiscal year. However, its implementation has been 
hindered by persistent opposition from organisations such as the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU). This thesis intends to examine, amongst other things, the 
feasibility of the youth wage subsidy in addressing the youth unemployment problem. 
                                                                
1 The RDP attempted to provide an equitable distribution of income and wealth to all South Africans (ANC 
1994: 3). 
2 GEAR strove to attain an employment growth rate of 6 per cent per annum as well as create 400 000 job 
opportunities (Department of Finance 1996: 3). 
3 ASGISA aimed at lowering the (narrowly defined) unemployment rate to under 15 per cent by 2014 (The 
Presidency Republic of South Africa 2005: 2). 
4 The New Growth Path attempts to create over 5 million jobs by 2020 using micro and macro policies that 
encourage labour market activities (South Africa Government 2010: 1). 
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1.2 Statement of problem 
 
In South Africa youths constitute a large proportion (about 60 per cent) of the economically 
active population (EAP) or labour force (LF). However, youths have a relatively greater 
likelihood of being unemployed. Low levels of youth employment have adverse effects on the 
economy such as increasing the dependency ratio and poverty rates, and reducing economic 
growth (Altman 2007:8). As a result, unemployed youths survive by engaging in activities 
like crime or relying on the wage income and non-wage income (e.g. social grants) earned by 
the other family members. 
 
In a quest to alleviate the problem of youth of unemployment, the South African National 
Treasury proposed the introduction of a youth wage subsidy in February 2011. The youth 
wage subsidy was expected to be implemented in April of 2012.
5
 The aim of this study is to 
critically analyse the feasibility of this subsidy and its possible impact on the youth 
unemployment problem. This proposition on the wage subsidy motivates the research 
question for this study: To what extent is the youth wage subsidy a feasible solution to youth 
unemployment?   
 
1.3  Objectives of the study  
 
For the remainder of this study youths are defined as people aged 18-29 years, as they are the 
people age-eligible for the proposed youth wage subsidy. Using all the available South 
African labour survey data released by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) between 1995 and 
2011, this study aims to: 
 Examine the demographic and education characteristics of the youth labour force and 
their labour market outcomes, for instance, employment likelihood, work activities if 
they are employed, and profile of unemployed youths; 
 Investigate the main causes of youth unemployment; 
 Critically evaluate the potential effectiveness of youth wage subsidy on youth 
employment. 
 
  
                                                                
5 At the time of this study the subsidy programme had still not been implemented. 
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1.4  Research methodology and outline of the study 
 
The data sources for the thesis include the annual October Household Survey (OHS) that took 
place in from 1995 to 1999, the biannual Labour Force Survey (LFS), which replaced the 
OHS and took place from 2000 to 2007, and the current Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(QLFS), which has taken place four times a year since 2008. The QLFS data until 2011 are 
used. For the remainder of the study the OHSs will be referred to as OHS 1995, OHS 1996, 
etc., while the LFSs will be referred to as LFS 2000a (for the first round of LFS in 2000), LFS 
2000b (second round in 2000), LFS 2001a, and so forth. Finally, the QLFSs will be referred 
to as QLFS 2008Q1 (for the first round of QLFS in 2008), QLFS 2008Q2 (second round in 
2008), and so forth. 
 
The Stata software is used to conduct bivariate statistical analyses to examine the profile of 
youth narrow labour force, employed and narrow unemployed. This is followed by 
multivariate econometric analyses to look at the impact of various demographic, educational 
attainment and household characteristics of the youth narrow labour market status. 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 first provides a literature review of recent 
studies on how youths have been faring in the labour market since the advent of democracy, 
before briefly explaining the labour market status derivation methodology under the narrow 
and broad definitions. The chapter then moves on to analyse the trends in youth labour force 
participation, employment and unemployment under the narrow definition using the 
abovementioned OHS/LFS/QLFS data between 1995 and 2011. Chapter 3 deals with the 
causes of youth unemployment. Causes from the supply side include lack of mobility and 
inadequate resources among the youth, too high expectations, lack of experience and soft 
skills. From the demand side, possible causes of youth unemployment are skills mismatch, 
employment and wage rigidities, discrimination by employers, and the failure of the informal 
sector to generate employment for the unskilled or lowly educated youths. Other causes of 
youth unemployment are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 begins by discussing the various possible active and passive policy options to deal 
with youth unemployment, before focusing on how the youth wage subsidy programme works 
in South Africa. The chapter then looks at the possible merits and drawbacks of the subsidy 
on the labour market outcomes, before investigating whether the countries that have 
implemented the youth wage subsidy programme in the past have successfully improved the 
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labour market outcomes for the youths, and what lessons South Africa can learn from these 
countries. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: HOW HAVE YOUTHS BEEN FARING IN THE LABOUR 
MARKET SINCE THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY? 
 
2.1      Introduction 
 
This chapter examines how youths
6
 have been faring in the labour market since the transition 
using OHS 1995-QLFS 2011Q4 data. The chapter first reviews the results of past studies on 
youth labour market trends in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the labour market status 
derivation methodology, in particular explaining how the labour market status of the working-
age population is derived under the narrow (strict) and broad (expanded) defintions. Section 
2.4 looks at the youth labour force (LF) and youth labour force participation rates (LFPRs); 
this is followed by Section 2.5, which provides a detailed investigation on youth employment 
trends and the work activities of employed youth. Section 2.6 deals with youth unemployment 
trends. Section 2.7 presents the conclusions of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Literature review on youth labour market trends 
 
This section reviews previous studies on youth labour market trends. It must be emphasised, 
however, that very few studies provided an in-depth statistical analysis on what has happened 
to youths in the labour market since the transition. Most of the studies only divided the 
working-age population into age cohorts (e.g. 15-24 years, 25-34 years, 35-44 years, 45-54 
years and 55-65 years) before briefly examining what happened to each age cohort by 
comparing OHS 1995 with the latest available LFS at the time of writing.  
 
Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1999) modelled the vulnerability and low earnings in the South 
African labour market using the OHS 1995 data set. They ran a probit regression
7
 to estimate 
the probability of finding employment for the broad labour force and found that the 
probability of employment increased in older age cohorts relative to those in the 16 to 25 age 
cohort. Burger and Woolard (2005) studied the state of the labour market after the first decade 
of democracy by comparing OHS 1995 with LFS 2002a. The focus of their paper was on the 
                                                                
6 As discussed in Chapter 1, youths are defined as people aged 18-29 years at the time of the survey, while adults 
were defined as people aged 30-65 years. That is, those aged 15-17 years are excluded. These people account for 
only about 0.5 per cent of the labour force in all surveys under study, so excluding them would have only a 
negligent effect on the results of the forthcoming analyses.  
7 A probit regression is an econometric technique used when the dependent variable is binary, for example, 
employment status of the labour force. The value of this binary dependent variable is either one (e.g. employed) 
or zero (e.g. unemployed) (Gujarati 2003: 608). 
 
 
 
 
  
6 
characteristics of the unemployed under the broad definition. They found that the 
unemployment rate was the highest amongst the black and coloured population, and more 
than half of the unemployed were aged 16-34 years at the time of the survey. This gives 
credence to the fact that unemployment is more serious amongst the young people in South 
Africa. 
 
Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2005) compared OHS 1995 with LFS 2002b to analyse the 
characteristics of the LF, the employed and unemployed using the broad definition. They 
highlighted that the growth in the LF since the transition was attributed to the employment of 
women, blacks, those living in the urban areas, those with secondary education, as well as 
those aged 15-34 years. They also found that the broad LFPR increased for blacks, women, 
those between the ages of 15-24 years and people from Limpopo. The increase in 
employment between the two periods occurred mainly among blacks, women, those aged 35-
54 years and people with at least Matric. Finally, the likelihood of unemployment was higher 
for black women aged 15-24 years. 
 
Kingdon and Knight (2005) studied unemployment in South Africa between OHS 1995 and 
LFS 2003b under the broad definition, focusing specifically on the causes, problems and 
policies related to unemployment. They ran a probit regression to estimate the likelihood of 
the LF being unemployed and estimated that those from the younger age cohorts (16-20 years 
and 21-25 years) were more likely to be unemployed in comparison to the older age cohorts. 
For example, youths aged 16-20 years were eight percentage points more likely to be 
unemployed in comparison to the reference group (26-35 years). Oosthuizen (2006) 
investigated the post-apartheid labour market by comparing OHS 1995 with LFS 2004b. He 
ran a probit regression on the broad LF and found that the youngsters aged 15-24 years, 
blacks, men, those with Matric or above were more likely to participate in the labour market. 
Oosthuizen also found that the LF between the ages of 15-24 years, blacks, women, those 
without Matric and those residing in the Limpopo province were associated with a lower 
likelihood of employment. 
 
Bhorat (2009) examined the likelihood of employment of the broad LF in OHS 1995 and LFS 
2005b. He found that in OHS 1995, whites, women, people aged between 25-55 years, those 
with at least Matric and those residing in rural areas and Gauteng province were more likely 
to be employed. However, in LFS 2005b, whites, men, the elderly aged 45 years and above, 
those with post-Matric qualification, those residing in rural areas as well as those in the 
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Western Cape and Gauteng provinces were more likely to be employed. In addition, after 
analysing LFS 2005b in greater detail, it was found that the broad unemployment rate for the 
15-24 years age cohort was the highest (63.79 per cent), followed by those aged 25-34 years 
(40.29 per cent). The study by Van der Westhuizen, Goga and Oosthuizen (2006) also 
compared OHS 1995 with LFS 2005b, but they focused on the female LF under the broad 
definition. They found that the female proportion of the employed increased for all the age 
cohorts except female youths in the 15-24 year age cohort. Furthermore, the broad 
unemployment rate for women between the ages of 15-24 years was about 72 per cent, which 
was the highest rate in comparison with other age cohorts. 
 
All the above studies used only one or two surveys to briefly look at what happened to youths 
in the labour market. Only three studies examined more than two surveys to examine labour 
market trends, but once again they only briefly investigated how the youths fared. First, Arora 
and Ricci (2005) specifically focused on black unemployment in South Africa by using all 
available OHSs and LFSs from 1995 to 2001, and they found that both the narrow and broad 
unemployment rates were higher for the LF in the youngest age cohort (15-25 years), 
individuals without Matric, people residing in rural areas as well as those in KwaZulu-Natal 
and Eastern Cape provinces.   
 
Yu (2008) used all available OHSs and LFSs from 1995 to 2006 to derive trends on the 
characteristics of the broad LF, the employed and the broad unemployed. He found that men, 
blacks, people from Gauteng and Western Cape and those in the age cohort 25-34 years and 
35-44 years were more likely to participate in the LF. It was also found that people aged 25-
44 years accounted for about 60 per cent of the employed between LFS 2000 and LFS 2006. 
Moreover, the unemployment rate was highest amongst 15-24 year age cohort (ranging 
between 60 and 70 per cent in the surveys under study). Finally, Hlekiso and Mahlo (2009) 
used all available September LFSs data between 2001 and 2007 to present a descriptive 
analysis of the employed and unemployed under the narrow definition. They found that the 
age cohort with the highest unemployment rate was 15-34 years (about 70 per cent). 
Furthermore, they found out that unemployment was higher amongst women, blacks and 
individuals previously involved in unskilled occupations.  
 
Only three studies focused particularly on the youth. First, Altman (2007) compared OHS 
1995 with LFS 2002b to derive youth employment and unemployment trends. She defined 
youths as people aged 15-34 years at the time of the survey. It was found that the youths were 
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more likely to be unemployed in comparison to people in older age cohorts. In particular, the 
unemployment rate was very high (more than 50 per cent in 2002) for people aged 15-24 
years. Moreover, this age cohort accounted for a small share of the LF (15 per cent) but the 
largest proportion of the unemployed (30 per cent). In contrast, Mlatsheni and Rospabé 
(2002) looked at the youth LF aged 15-30 years under the broad definition. They used OHS 
1999 to run a multinomial logistic regression
8
 and found out that those youths who were male, 
white, between 24 and 30 years, with a post-Matric qualification, living in rural areas and the 
Western Cape Province are more likely to be employed. The paper also found that the 
likelihood of unemployment was higher amongst those aged 15-24 years. Finally, DPRU 
(2012) focused on youths (15-34 years) in comparison to their older counterparts (35 and 
above) in the labour market since 2008. The study found that youths are more likely to be 
discouraged work seekers, less likely to be employed and are relatively less educated than the 
adults. In addition, the employed youths dominated in the wholesale and retail trade, financial 
and business sectors, but they were under-represented in the highly-skilled occupations. 
Lastly, youths were less likely to be permanently employed and receive benefits (e.g. paid 
leave, medical aid, retirement fund contributions by employers, etc.). 
 
There are other studies that focused specifically on youths, but they concentrated on issues 
other than labour market trends, such as the causes of youth unemployment and the feasibility 
of the youth wage subsidy. These studies will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
2.3 Derivation of labour market status 
 
Labour market status can be defined either under the narrow (strict) definition and the broad 
(expanded) definition.
9
 According to Barker (2008), until LFS 2007b, the individuals are 
defined as unemployed under the narrow definition if: 
o They did not work for at least one hour during the seven days prior to the interview;  
o They wanted to work and were available to start work within seven days of the 
interview; 
o They had taken active steps to look for work or start a business in the four weeks prior 
to the interview; 
 
                                                                
8 Multinomial logistic regression is also known as polytomous logistic regression. The dependent variable is a 
categorical variable, but there is no ordering in the categories, for instance, labour market status (1: inactive, 2: 
employed, 3: narrow unemployed, 4: discouraged workseekers). 
9 For the remainder of the dissertation, they will be referred to as narrow and broad definitions respectively.  
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If an individual satisfies only the first two criteria above (i.e., he/she has not taken any active 
steps to seek work), he/she is defined as unemployed under the broad definition. The 
discouraged workseekers are then derived as the difference between broad unemployed and 
narrow unemployed. Discouraged job seekers are included only as part of the labour force and 
unemployed under the broad definition, but rather defined as inactive under the narrow 
definition. Table 2.1 below illustrates in greater detail how the LFPRs and unemployment 
rates are calculated under the narrow and broad definitions. 
 
Table 2.1:  Derivation of narrow and broad labour force participation rates and unemployment rates 
Labour market status of the working-age population (15-65 years) 
(1): Employed; (2) Unemployed; (3): Discouraged job seeker; (4) Inactive 
Narrow labour force participation rate 
)4()3()2()1(
)2()1(
6515 




years
LF
 
Broad labour force participation rate 
)4()3()2()1(
)3()2()1(
6515 




years
LF
 
Narrow unemployment rate 
)2()1(
)2(


LF
unemployed
 
Broad unemployment rate 
)3()2()1(
)3()2(



LF
unemployed
 
 
With the adoption of the QLFS since 2008, the labour market status derivation methodology 
was revised (Statistics South Africa 2008). The narrow unemployed were still derived 
similarly as was the case until 2007. However, the QLFS broad methodology was not 
comparable with the OHS/LFS broad methodology. Discouraged workseekers in the QLFSs 
were identified more strictly in these surveys, as the respondents’ answers to the question 
‘What was the main reason why you did not try to find work or start a business in the last four 
weeks?’ was involved. For the remaining respondents who were not classified as either 
employed or narrow unemployed, if their reasons for not trying to find work or start a 
business in the last four weeks was ‘no jobs available in the area’, ‘unable to find work 
requiring his/her skills’ or ‘lost hope of finding any kind of work’, and they claimed that they 
could start working (if offered a suitable job) or start a business within one week, they were 
defined as discouraged workseekers, while the remaining respondents were defined as 
inactive. Broad unemployed were then derived as the sum of narrow unemployed and 
discouraged workseekers. 
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As a result, an abrupt decline of broad LF, LFPRs and unemployment rates was reflected 
during the changeover between the LFS and QLFS (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Table A.1 in 
Appendix A shows the characteristics of discouraged youths in comparison to the narrowly 
unemployed in QLFS 2011Q4. It can be seen that discouraged workseekers are more likely to 
be black, with incomplete secondary education and from rural areas. Furthermore, the 
discouraged workers are more likely to come from disadvantaged provinces (e.g., Eastern 
Cape and Limpopo) associated with poor mobility and poverty.  
 
Figure 2.1: Labour force participation rates, 1995-2011 
  
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.2: Unemployment rates, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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As a result of the incomparability of the broad methodology between OHSs/LFSs and QLFSs, 
for the remainder of the dissertation the youth LF, employed and unemployed under the 
narrow definition, will be the focus of the analyses, unless stated otherwise. 
 
2.4 Youth labour force 
 
Table 2.2 presents the size of the youth narrow LF by age cohort from 1995 to 2011. The 
youth labour force increased from 3.7 million in OHS 1995 to 6.2 million in QLFS 2008Q1 
before slightly declining due to the impact of the global recession. The greatest increase (of 
about 2 million) occurred between OHS 1998 and LFS 2002a. The youth share of the LF was 
the highest in LFS 2001b and LFS 2002a at 36.6 per cent. In addition, this share fluctuated 
throughout the years, rising from 31.5 per cent in OHS 1996 to 36.6 in LFS 2002a, before 
dropping to 32.0 per cent in QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Table 2.2: Narrow labour force by age cohort, 1995-2011 
 Narrow labour force (1 000s) 18-29 years 
18-24 
years 
25-29 
years 
30-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-65 
years 
18-65 
years 
Number 
(1 000s) 
Share 
OHS 1995 1 694 2 023 2 074 3 224 1 740 0 697 11 451 3 716 32.5% 
OHS 1996 1 649 1 857 2 005 3 212 1 709 0 693 11 125 3 505 31.5% 
OHS 1997 1 571 2 039 2 047 3 314 1 818 0 679 11 468 3 609 31.5% 
OHS 1998 1 911 2 256 2 265 3 457 1 852 0 703 12 444 4 167 33.5% 
OHS 1999 2 146 2 436 2 366 3 702 1 968 0 779 13 397 4 582 34.2% 
LFS 2000a 2 865 2 767 2 720 4 135 2 286 1 126 15 899 5 632 35.4% 
LFS 2000b 2 735 3 093 2 466 4 078 2 602 1 207 16 180 5 827 36.0% 
LFS 2001a 2 806 3 146 2 546 4 136 2 606 1 229 16 470 5 952 36.1% 
LFS 2001b 2 665 3 070 2 488 3 968 2 434 1 038 15 663 5 735 36.6% 
LFS 2002a 2 873 3 084 2 591 4 062 2 566 1 119 16 295 5 957 36.6% 
LFS 2002b 2 765 3 089 2 626 4 012 2 511 1 065 16 067 5 853 36.4% 
LFS 2003a 2 790 3 136 2 691 4 033 2 558 1 057 16 264 5 925 36.4% 
LFS 2003b 2 622 3 002 2 662 3 871 2 522 1 035 15 714 5 624 35.8% 
LFS 2004a 2 609 2 935 2 730 3 839 2 508 1 061 15 682 5 544 35.4% 
LFS 2004b 2 559 2 876 2 739 3 824 2 572 1 081 15 652 5 436 34.7% 
LFS 2005a 2 560 2 986 2 809 3 888 2 610 1 204 16 058 5 547 34.5% 
LFS 2005b 2 764 3 016 2 941 3 970 2 728 1 202 16 620 5 780 34.8% 
LFS 2006a 2 689 3 049 2 952 3 894 2 732 1 228 16 543 5 738 34.7% 
LFS 2006b 2 791 3 096 2 992 4 085 2 830 1 243 17 037 5 887 34.6% 
LFS 2007a 2 763 3 110 2 998 4 015 2 729 1 224 16 840 5 874 34.9% 
LFS 2007b 2 727 3 156 2 952 4 135 2 835 1 253 17 056 5 883 34.5% 
QLFS 2008Q1 2 964 3 272 3 038 4 300 2 894 1 250 17 717 6 235 35.2% 
QLFS 2008Q2 2 950 3 258 3 078 4 298 2 901 1 271 17 756 6 209 35.0% 
QLFS 2008Q3 2 912 3 267 3 043 4 336 2 896 1 248 17 701 6 179 34.9% 
QLFS 2008Q4 2 857 3 266 3 046 4 327 2 918 1 240 17 655 6 123 34.7% 
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Table 2.2: Continued 
 Narrow labour force (1 000s) 18-29 years 
18-24 
years 
25-29 
years 
30-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-65 
years 
18-65 
years 
Number 
(1 000s) 
Share 
QLFS 2009Q1 2 895 3 238 3 047 4 361 2 947 1 270 17 759 6 134 34.5% 
QLFS 2009Q2 2 782 3 172 2 981 4 355 2 900 1 235 17 425 5 954 34.2% 
QLFS 2009Q3 2 601 3 095 2 963 4 343 2 836 1 192 17 030 5 696 33.4% 
QLFS 2009Q4 2 646 3 092 2 977 4 333 2 846 1 193 17 088 5 738 33.6% 
QLFS 2010Q1 2 628 3 126 2 935 4 365 2 834 1 200 17 088 5 754 33.7% 
QLFS 2010Q2 2 668 3 063 2 911 4 307 2 855 1 220 17 023 5 731 33.7% 
QLFS 2010Q3 2 607 3 113 3 040 4 505 2 852 1 227 17 343 5 720 33.0% 
QLFS 2010Q4 2 468 3 095 3 018 4 561 2 867 1 235 17 245 5 563 32.3% 
QLFS 2011Q1 2 533 3 150 3 047 4 624 2 872 1 213 17 439 5 683 32.6% 
QLFS 2011Q2 2 590 3 201 3 042 4 657 2 890 1 258 17 638 5 791 32.8% 
QLFS 2011Q3 2 569 3 170 3 093 4 700 2 934 1 261 17 728 5 740 32.4% 
QLFS 2011Q4 2 519 3 158 3 096 4 730 2 898 1 300 17 703 5 677 32.0% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
The gender shares of the youth LF remained stable over the period under study, with the male 
share remaining at about 55 per cent during the period under study. With regard to the youth 
labour force by race, Table A.2 in Appendix A shows that the number of the black youths in 
the LF had been increasing for the period under study, while that of white youths was 
decreasing. The black youths also constituted the largest proportion of the youth LF, in excess 
of 60 per cent, as shown in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3: Racial share of the youth narrow labour force, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Furthermore, the black share had been steadily increasing throughout the years, reaching 
about 72 per cent in QLFS 2011Q4. This increase could be attributed to the abolition of unfair 
apartheid practices, which in turn encouraged black youths to enter the labour market. 
Furthermore, the implementation of Affirmative Action regulation such Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) gave black youths more hope of finding employment, thereby leading 
to the increasing share of black youths in the LF. 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that the most of the youth LF came from the Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and 
Western Cape provinces, accounting for 28 per cent, 20 per cent and 13 per cent respectively 
of the youth labour force in QLFS 2011Q4. This may be a result of migration, where youths 
migrate from other provinces with the hope of finding employment in these economically 
advanced provinces associated with a greater likelihood of employment. The smallest share of 
the youth LF is from the Northern Cape, which accounted for only 2 per cent of the youth LF, 
and North West, which represented only 5 per cent. The provincial share did not change 
significantly over the period under study except for Gauteng and Western Cape  provinces, 
which experienced a slight increase, and this could be due to the impact of migration (i.e. 
people from the less developed provinces associated with a lower likelihood of finding 
employment have moved to these two provinces seeking work). 
 
Figure 2.4: Provincial share of youth narrow labour force, QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4. 
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Figure 2.5 presents the proportion of the youth LF in each educational attainment category. A 
majority of them had incomplete secondary education or Matric. Those with post-Matric 
certificates, diplomas or degrees accounted for only about 10 to 15 per cent of the youth LF. 
Nonetheless, the youth LF became more educated over the years, as the proportion of them 
with at least Matric increased from 43 per cent in OHS 1995 to 51 per cent in QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Figure 2.5: Share of youth narrow labour force in each educational attainment category, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
With regards to trends in narrow LFPRs, Figure 2.6 and Table A.3 in Appendix A show what 
happen in each age cohort, indicating that the LFPR was considerably lower for the 18-29 
year cohort in all surveys under study, ranging between 39 and 59 per cent throughout the 
years. The LFPR was the highest for the 30-34 years and 35-44 years cohorts. 
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Figure 2.6: Narrow labour force participation rates by age cohort, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.7: Youth narrow labour force participation rates by gender, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.7 above and Table A.4 in Appendix A show that the male LFPR was higher than the 
female LFPR in all surveys under study. After a slight decline from OHS 1995 to OHS 1996, 
the male LFPR increased by about 16 percentage points. After that the male LFPR has 
 
 
 
 
  
16 
hovered around 57 and 60 per cent, after which it declined in QLFS 2009Q2. The female 
LFPR showed the same trends as the male LFPR. Between OHS 1997 and LFS 2000a there 
was a sharp increase and then after the rate remained between 48 and 52 per cent between 
LFS 2000b and QLFS 2009Q2. 
 
LFPR was the lowest for the blacks during the period under study, as shown in Figure 2.8 and 
Table A.5 in Appendix A. The black LFPR increased between OHS 1996 and LFS 2000a 
before declining between LFS 2000b and LFS 2003. There was an abrupt increase in the 
black LFPR during the changeover from OHS to LFS by about 12 percentage points. Finally, 
the white youth LFPR generally showed a declining trend for the period under study.  
 
Figure 2.8: Youth narrow labour force participation rate by race, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data 
 
Looking at the LFPR by province, Figure 2.9 shows that the Western Cape had the highest 
participation rate of 67.7 per cent in 2011Q4, followed by Gauteng at 62.6 per cent. 
Furthermore, the youth LFPR by province did not change significantly over the years, as 
shown in Table A.6 in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2.9: Youth narrow labour force participation rates by province, QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Figure 2.10 and Table A.7 in Appendix A show the LFPR by educational attainment. It can be 
seen that LFPR increases as one moves across to the more educated categories, with the LFPR 
being the highest amongst those with post-Matric qualification. This could be attributed to the 
fact that a higher education level is associated with higher likelihood of employment. 
 
Figure 2.10: Youth narrow labour force participation rates by educational attainment, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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In summary, the majority of the youth labour force participants were blacks, residing in 
Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal or Western Cape, and those with post-Matric qualifications. Also, 
the youths accounted for about one third of the labour force during the period under study. 
 
2.5  Youth employment 
 
This section discusses the youth employment levels and trends, the demographic and 
educational attainment characteristics of the youth employed, as well as their work activities. 
First, Table 2.3 shows that the number of employed had been increasing steadily over the 
years across all the age cohorts. The highest number of employed was recorded for the age 
group 35-44 years. The number of youths employed showed a generally stable increase from 
about 2.634 million in OHS 1995 to about 3.438 in QLFS 2011Q4. The youth share of 
employed fluctuated between 26 and 29 per cent. 
 
Table 2.3: Youth employed by age cohort, 1995-2011   
 Employed (1 000s) 18-29 years 
18-24 
years 
25-29 
years 
30-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-65 
years 
18-65 
years 
Number 
(1 000s) 
Share 
OHS 1995 1 085 1 549 1 727 2 858 1 587 654 9 460 2 634 27.8% 
OHS 1996 1 060 1 375 1 613 2 740 1 508 633 8 928 2 435 27.3% 
OHS 1997 949 1 450 1 605 2 809 1 610 631 9 053 2 398 26.5% 
OHS 1998 1 055 1 494 1 694 2 857 1 594 634 9 329 2 549 27.3% 
OHS 1999 1 235 1 667 1 842 3 077 1 748 723 10 292 2 902 28.2% 
LFS 2000a 1 542 1 746 1 965 3 369 1 979 1 045 11 646 3 288 28.2% 
LFS 2000b 1 420 2 054 1 841 3 354 2 283 1 126 12 077 3 474 28.8% 
LFS 2001a 1 389 2 018 1 900 3 409 2 276 1 139 12 130 3 406 28.1% 
LFS 2001b 1 232 1 849 1 799 3 183 2 094 928 11 086 3 081 27.8% 
LFS 2002a 1 292 1 892 1 859 3 246 2 174 1 017 11 481 3 185 27.7% 
LFS 2002b 1 204 1 862 1 902 3 171 2 105 958 11 203 3 066 27.4% 
LFS 2003a 1 133 1 886 1 915 3 195 2 154 946 11 229 3 019 26.9% 
LFS 2003b 1 172 1 934 1 978 3 147 2 182 943 11 356 3 106 27.4% 
LFS 2004a 1 152 1 864 2 021 3 144 2 165 978 11 323 3 015 26.6% 
LFS 2004b 1 233 1 896 2 048 3 130 2 266 1 003 11 576 3 129 27.0% 
LFS 2005a 1 210 1 914 2 083 3 224 2 299 1 107 11 836 3 124 26.4% 
LFS 2005b 1 341 1 897 2 252 3 249 2 373 1 102 12 214 3 238 26.5% 
LFS 2006a 1 305 1 994 2 238 3 222 2 411 1 155 12 325 3 299 26.8% 
LFS 2006b 1 391 2 085 2 266 3 343 2 480 1 157 12 721 3 476 27.3% 
LFS 2007a 1 348 2 050 2 293 3 341 2 394 1 143 12 569 3 398 27.0% 
LFS 2007b 1 451 2 212 2 337 3 533 2 519 1 171 13 223 3 663 27.7% 
QLFS 2008Q1 1 603 2 315 2 327 3 600 2 586 1 154 13 584 3 918 28.8% 
QLFS 2008Q2 1 635 2 257 2 395 3 617 2 611 1 173 13 688 3 892 28.4% 
QLFS 2008Q3 1 556 2 275 2 384 3 615 2 627 1 167 13 624 3 831 28.1% 
QLFS 2008Q4 1 583 2 309 2 422 3 697 2 640 1 176 13 828 3 892 28.1% 
QLFS 2009Q1 1 515 2 173 2 381 3 693 2 661 1 196 13 617 3 688 27.1% 
QLFS 2009Q2 1 445 2 173 2 304 3 671 2 584 1 169 13 345 3 618 27.1% 
QLFS 2009Q3 1 348 2 112 2 208 3 592 2 502 1 112 12 872 3 459 26.9% 
QLFS 2009Q4 1 374 2 068 2 273 3 593 2 539 1 114 12 960 3 442 26.6% 
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Table 2.3: Continued 
 Employed (1 000s) 18-29 years 
18-24 
years 
25-29 
years 
30-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-65 
years 
18-65 
years 
Number 
(1 000s) 
Share 
QLFS 2010Q1 1 317 2 086 2 203 3 585 2 503 1 113 12 807 3 403 26.6% 
QLFS 2010Q2 1 302 2 034 2 214 3 563 2 509 1 122 12 745 3 336 26.2% 
QLFS 2010Q3 1 277 2 060 2 303 3 705 2 499 1 139 12 982 3 336 25.7% 
QLFS 2010Q4 1 250 2 089 2 288 3 803 2 543 1 159 13 131 3 339 25.4% 
QLFS 2011Q1 1 280 2 040 2 290 3 844 2 516 1 141 13 113 3 321 25.3% 
QLFS 2011Q2 1 301 2 027 2 284 3 797 2 527 1 186 13 123 3 329 25.4% 
QLFS 2011Q3 1 281 2 090 2 324 3 844 2 593 1 186 13 319 3 371 25.3% 
QLFS 2011Q4 1 279 2 160 2 360 3 918 2 550 1 222 13 488 3 438 25.5% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
The shares of youth employed by gender were stable over the period under study, with men 
accounting for about 60%. With regards to race, Figure 2.11 shows that the share of blacks 
increased steadily from above 50% in OHS 1995 to nearly 70% in QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Figure 2.11: Racial share of youth employed, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.12 shows that the most of the employed youths resided in the Gauteng (26 per cent), 
KwaZulu-Natal (22 per cent) and Western Cape (15 per cent) provinces. The provincial 
shares did not change significantly over the years. 
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Figure 2.12: Provincial share of youth employed, QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Figure 2.13 presents the share of the youths employed in each educational attainment 
category, and it can be seen that a large proportion of employed youths have incomplete 
secondary or Matric only. The employed youths became more educated over the years, as the 
proportion of the employed youths with at least Matric increased throughout the years from 
46.9  per cent in OHS 1995 to 54.4  per cent in QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Figure 2.13: Share of the youth employed in each educational attainment category, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data 
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With regards to the work activities of the employed youths, Figure 2.14 and Table A.8 in 
Appendix A show the share of employed youths by occupation.  Most youths were employed 
in the following occupation categories: elementary occupations (25 per cent), clerks (15 per 
cent), service workers and market sales (18 per cent), craft and related workers (12 per cent).  
 
Figure 2.14: Share of the employed youths in each broad occupation category, QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4 data. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 2.15 shows the share of youths employed in each skills level of 
occupation; it can be seen that a high proportion of youths are employed in the semi-skilled 
and unskilled occupations.
10
 In fact, the proportion of youths employed in highly skilled 
occupations fluctuated only in the 15% to 20% range throughout the period under study. 
Figure 2.16 shows that a greater proportion of adults (28.4 per cent) were employed in highly 
skilled occupations, while this share was lower for the employed youths (17.5 per cent) in 
QLFS 2011Q4. This is possibly due to the fact that adult workers have more work experience 
and skills, thereby enabling them to be involved in highly skilled occupations.  
  
                                                                
10 Highly skilled occupations include: (1) Legislators, senior officials, managers; (2) Professionals; (3) 
Technicians and associate. Semi-skilled occupations include: (1) Clerks; (2) Service workers, shop and market 
sales; (3) Skilled agricultural and fishery worker; (4) Craft and related workers; (5) Plant and machinery 
operators and assemblers. Finally, unskilled occupations include: (1) Elementary occupations; (2) Domestic 
workers. 
 
 
 
 
  
22 
Figure 2.15: Share of youths employed in each skills level category, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.16: Proportion of youths and adults employed in each skills level of occupation, QLFS 2011Q4   
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4 data. 
 
Figure 2.17 and Table A.9 in Appendix A show the share of employed youths in each broad 
industry category in QLFS 2011Q4. They show that the majority of youths were employed in 
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the tertiary sector, specifically in wholesale and retail (28 per cent), community, social and 
personal services (16 per cent) and financial, insurance and business services (14 per cent) 
industries. 
 
Figure 2.17: Share of employed youths in each broad industry category, QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4 data. 
 
Finally, Table A.10 in Appendix A shows the number of youths employed in the formal and 
informal sectors.
11
 The formal sector workers increased from 1.9 million in OHS 1999 to 
about 2.4 million in QLFS 2011Q4, while informal sector workers increased by about 0.36 
million between OHS 1999 and QLFS 2011Q4.  
 
In summary, youths accounted for less than 30 per cent of employed persons between 1995 
and 2011. Only about half of youths employed had at least Matric. Hence, a lower proportion 
of youths employed were involved in highly skilled occupations associated with better job 
security and higher remuneration, compared with employed adults. Finally, the black share of 
employed youths increased steadily during the period under study. 
 
                                                                
11 It is not possible to derive the formal/informal sector status of employees in OHS 1995 and OHS 1996 because 
employees were not asked to declare whether they worked for formal or informal businesses or not. This has 
been done only since OHS 1997 (Essop and Yu, 2008: 4). 
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2.6 Youth unemployment 
 
Table 2.4 shows narrow unemployment by age cohort, and it can be seen that the number of 
unemployed youths has more than doubled from about 1.1 million in OHS 1995 to about 2.5 
million in QLFS 2011Q4. In addition, the youth share of the unemployed hovered between 50 
and 60 per cent during the period under study. 
 
Table 2.4: Narrow youth unemployed by age cohort, 1995-2011 
 
Narrow unemployed (1 000s) 18-29 years 
18-24 
years 
25-29 
years 
30-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-65 
years 
18-65 
years 
Number 
(1 000s) 
Share 
OHS 1995 609 474 347 366 153 43 1 992 1 082 54.4% 
OHS 1996 589 482 392 472 201 60 2 196 1 070 48.7% 
OHS 1997 622 589 442 505 208 49 2 415 1 211 50.2% 
OHS 1998 856 762 570 600 258 70 3 116 1 618 51.9% 
OHS 1999 911 769 524 626 221 56 3 107 1 680 54.1% 
LFS 2000a 1 323 1 021 755 766 307 81 4 253 2 344 55.1% 
LFS 2000b 1 315 1 039 624 724 319 82 4 103 2 354 57.4% 
LFS 2001a 1 418 1 128 646 727 330 90 4 339 2 546 58.7% 
LFS 2001b 1 433 1 221 689 785 339 110 4 577 2 654 58.0% 
LFS 2002a 1 581 1 192 731 816 392 102 4 814 2 772 57.6% 
LFS 2002b 1 560 1 227 723 841 405 106 4 862 2 787 57.3% 
LFS 2003a 1 657 1 249 775 838 404 111 5 034 2 906 57.7% 
LFS 2003b 1 450 1 068 683 724 340 92 4 357 2 518 57.8% 
LFS 2004a 1 457 1 071 710 695 343 82 4 358 2 528 58.0% 
LFS 2004b 1 327 980 691 694 306 78 4 076 2 307 56.6% 
LFS 2005a 1 350 1 073 726 665 311 97 4 222 2 423 57.4% 
LFS 2005b 1 423 1 118 689 721 355 100 4 406 2 542 57.7% 
LFS 2006a 1 384 1 055 714 672 321 73 4 219 2 439 57.8% 
LFS 2006b 1 400 1 011 726 742 351 86 4 316 2 411 55.9% 
LFS 2007a 1 416 1 060 705 675 335 81 4 272 2 476 58.0% 
LFS 2007b 1 275 945 615 601 315 82 3 833 2 220 57.9% 
QLFS 2008Q1 1 360 957 712 699 308 96 4 132 2 318 56.1% 
QLFS 2008Q2 1 315 1 002 683 681 290 98 4 069 2 316 56.9% 
QLFS 2008Q3 1 356 991 659 721 268 82 4 077 2 347 57.6% 
QLFS 2008Q4 1 274 957 624 630 278 64 3 827 2 231 58.3% 
QLFS 2009Q1 1 381 1 065 666 668 286 75 4 141 2 446 59.1% 
QLFS 2009Q2 1 337 999 677 684 316 66 4 079 2 336 57.3% 
QLFS 2009Q3 1 254 984 755 752 334 80 4 159 2 237 53.8% 
QLFS 2009Q4 1 272 1 024 704 741 307 79 4 127 2 296 55.6% 
QLFS 2010Q1 1 311 1 040 732 780 331 87 4 281 2 351 54.9% 
QLFS 2010Q2 1 366 1 029 696 744 346 98 4 279 2 394 56.0% 
QLFS 2010Q3 1 330 1 053 737 800 353 87 4 360 2 383 54.6% 
QLFS 2010Q4 1 218 1 006 731 758 324 76 4 113 2 225 54.1% 
QLFS 2011Q1 1 252 1 110 757 779 355 72 4 325 2 362 54.6% 
QLFS 2011Q2 1 289 1 173 758 860 363 72 4 515 2 462 54.5% 
QLFS 2011Q3 1 288 1 081 769 856 341 75 4 410 2 369 53.7% 
QLFS 2011Q4 1 240 999 737 812 348 78 4 214 2 239 53.1% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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There was no significant change in the gender share of youths unemployed during the period 
under investigation, as the male share always hovered about 50 per cent. In addition, blacks 
constituted the largest share of unemployed youths, in excess of 80 per cent as shown in 
Figure 2.18. The white share was the lowest (less than 3 per cent) for the period. 
 
Figure 2.18: Racial share of youth narrow unemployed, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.19: Provincial share of youth unemployed, QLFS 2011Q4 
 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4 data. 
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Gauteng accounted for the largest provincial share of unemployed youths (30 per cent), as 
shown in Figure 2.19 above. It is possible that many youths from other provinces migrated to 
Gauteng to seek work, but even though they were unable to find employment successfully at 
the end, they continued to reside in Gauteng to look for work. In contrast, Figure 2.20 shows 
that those with incomplete secondary education accounted for the largest share of youths 
unemployed during the period under study. Furthermore, just less than five per cent of 
unemployed youths had post-Matric qualifications. This result is expected, as higher 
educational attainment is associated with a lower likelihood of unemployment, especially as 
the South African economy demands more educated and highly-skilled labour. 
 
Figure 2.20: Share of the youth unemployed in each educational attainment category, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data 
 
With regards to the levels and trends in narrow unemployment rates, Figure 2.21 and Table 
A.11 in Appendix A show what happened by age cohort throughout the years.  It can be seen 
this rate has always been the highest amongst the youth, varying between 30 per cent and 50 
per cent. It peaked at about 50 per cent in LFS 2003a. The unemployment rate decreases 
across the older age cohorts. Furthermore, the ratio of the youth (18-29 years) unemployment 
rate to the non-youth (30-65 years) unemployment rate hovers around the 2.0-2.5 ranges in all 
surveys under study, indicating that youths are at least twice as likely to be unemployed in 
comparison to non-youths. 
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Figure 2.21: Narrow unemployment rates by age cohort, 1995-2011 
  
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.22 and Table A.12 in Appendix A show that the female unemployment rate was 
higher than male unemployment rate for the entire period under study. The female 
unemployment rates showed slight fluctuations; for example, between OHS 1995 and OHS 
1998 the rate was increasing by about 10 per cent, before declining in OHS 1999. However, 
from LFS 2000a to LFS 2002b the rate increased by about 15 per cent before beginning to 
decline. The male unemployment rate followed the same trend with fewer spikes.  
 
Figure 2.22: Narrow youth unemployment rates by gender, 1995-2011  
 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Figure 2.23 and Table A.13 in Appendix A show that the white youth unemployment rate has 
been steady at approximately 10 per cent between 1995 and 2011. Black youths, on the other 
hand, showed the highest unemployment rate, rising from 37 per cent in OHS 1995 to 
approximately 57 per cent in LFS 2003b, before declining to 44 per cent in QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Figure 2.23: Narrow youth unemployment rates by race, 1995-2011 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
Figure 2.24: Narrow youth unemployment rates province, QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2011Q4 data. 
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Furthermore, Figure 2.24 above and Table A.14 in Appendix A show that unemployment 
rates were the lowest in Gauteng and Western Cape, while Free State experienced the highest 
rise in the unemployment rate since 1995, and was the province with the highest 
unemployment rate in QLFS 2011Q4. 
 
Finally, Figure 2.25 and Table A.15 in Appendix A show that the unemployment rate was 
highest amongst those without Matric, ranging between 25 and 35 per cent during the period 
under study. Furthermore, the unemployment rate of degree holders was less than 15 per cent 
for the period under study. The results suggest that the likelihood of unemployment decreases 
as an individual becomes more educated. 
 
Figure 2.25: Narrow youth unemployment rates by educational attainment 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
In summary, youths accounted for more than half of the unemployed since the transition and 
the unemployment rate is the highest among youths. About 80% of unemployed youths were 
blacks. Also, those without Matric were associated with a greater likelihood of 
unemployment.  
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2.7  Further analyses on youth labour market trends 
 
This section will conduct further analyses on how youths fared in the labour market since the 
transition. It will first discuss the target growth rate, actual growth rate and employment 
absorption rate by age cohort, before conducting multivariate econometric analyses to look at 
the impact of various individual and household characteristics on the narrow labour market 
status of the youths in 2011. 
 
2.7.1  Target growth rate, actual growth rate and employment absorption rate 
As discussed above, in comparison to the adults, the increase in the youth labour force shown 
in Table 2.2 was not equally matched by the increase in youth employment shown in Table 
2.3. This led to a rapidly growing number of unemployed youths as well as a rise in the youth 
unemployment rate. These assertions have been confirmed by the results of the target growth 
rate (TGR
12
), the actual growth (AGR
13
) and employment absorption rate (EAR
14
) between 
OHS 1995 and QLFS 2011Q4.  
 
The TGR was highest in the age cohort of 55-65 at 94.18 per cent. The two youth age cohorts 
were second and third, with 76.07 per cent for the 18-24 years cohort and 73.37 per cent for 
the 25-29 year cohort as shown in Table A.16 in Appendix A. In addition, the TGR for youths 
(74.48 per cent) was higher than for non-youths (68.86 per cent). On the other hand, the AGR 
for youths was only 30.55 per cent. The lowest AGR was recorded for youths in the 18-24 
year age cohort, with a growth of only 17.85 per cent. This resulted in the lowest EAR for 18-
24 age cohort at 23 per cent as depicted in Figure 2.26 below. This implies that out of a 100 
net entrants in the age cohort of 18-24 years, only 23 were employed. The EAR was 41 per 
cent for the youths but a much higher 75 per cent for the non-youths.  In fact, it can be seen 
                                                                
12 The target growth rate (TGR) is the rate at which employment must grow to provide employment to all the net 
entrants to the labour market between two periods of time (from period X to period Y) which need not be  
consecutive.      
        
  
 where LF and E stand for then number of the labour force and employed 
respectively (Oosthuizen 2006: 17). 
13 The actual growth rate (AGR) is the growth rate of the number of employed from period X to period Y, 
(Oosthuizen 2006: 16).        
     
  
    
14 The employment absorption rate (EAR) measures the proportion of the net increase in the labour force from  
 
period X to period Y that find employment during the same period.      
     
        
 =  
   
   
 . An EAR of 100 per 
cent implies that the full net increase in the labour force between two periods were employed (Oosthuizen 2006: 
18). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
from Figure 2.26 that EAR increased as one moves across the older age cohorts, from 23 per 
cent in the 18-24years to 94 per cent in the 55-65 years age cohort. This confirms that youths 
are more likely to be unemployed. 
 
Figure 2.26: Employment absorption rate by age cohort, OHS 1995 vs. QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculation using OHS 1995 and QLFS 2011Q4 
 
2.7.2 Multivariate analyses on labour market status of youths 
The preceding analyses in Sections 2.4-2.6 are limited, as they looked only at one variable at 
a time. Therefore a multivariate analysis is conducted to look at the impact of various 
demographic, educational attainment and household composition characteristics on the labour 
market status of the youths.  
 
The focus is on what happened in 2011 and hence all four QLFSs were pooled together. 
Multinomial logistic regression is run, using the same approach as used by Mlatsheni and 
Rospabé (2002), except that the discouraged workseekers are distinguished clearly from the 
narrow unemployed in the dependent variable. In other words, the dependent variable is a 
discrete variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is an employee, 2 if he/she is self-
employed, 3 if he/she is a discouraged work seeker, and 4 if he/she is narrow unemployed. 
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The independent variables in the regressions include the demographic characteristics (gender, 
race and age), educational attainment, geographical situation (province), marital status, 
household headship status, number of children and elderly in the household, as well as the 
number of other employees, self-employed and unemployed in the household. Table 2.5 
shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression run on the labour market status of 
youths aged 18-29 years, QLFS 2011.  The ratio of relative risk is reported; it is explained as 
the risk of a category relative to the base category.  
 
Table 2.5: Multinomial logistic regression on labour market status of youths, QLFS 2011 
  Ratio of relative risk 
  Employed 
Self-
employed 
Discouraged  
workseekers 
Gender: Male 1.686*** 2.120*** 1.021 
Race: Coloured 1.712*** 0.651 1.237** 
Race: Indian 1.642*** 0.824 0.294*** 
Race: White 2.353*** 0.751 0.191*** 
Province: Western Cape 1.882*** 1.120 0.116*** 
Province: Northern Cape 1.145 0.836 0.470*** 
Province: Free State 1.081 0.958 0.474*** 
Province: KwaZulu-Natal 1.318*** 1.159 1.081 
province: North West 0.849* 0.504** 1.311*** 
Province: Gauteng 1.453*** 2.342*** 0.626*** 
Province: Mpumalanga 1.018 1.620** 0.953 
Province: Limpopo 0.855* 1.211 1.465*** 
Age: 25-29 years 1.775*** 1.897*** 0.866*** 
Education spline: Incomplete primary 1.002 1.189 1.043 
Education spline: Incomplete secondary 0.990* 1.045 0.915*** 
Education: Matric 1.169*** 0.643*** 0.679*** 
Education: Matric + Certificate/Diploma 1.446*** 0.394*** 0.402*** 
Education: Degree 1.633*** 0.423* 0.107*** 
Marital status: Married or live together 1.184*** 1.434** 0.737*** 
Headship status: Head 1.159*** 0.507*** 0.365*** 
Number of children 0-14 years in the household 1.116*** 1.249*** 1.308*** 
Number of elderly 60 years or above in the household 0.956 0.766** 1.140*** 
Number of other employees in the household 1.344*** 0.918 0.745*** 
Number of other self-employed in the household      1.078 1.894*** 0.828 
Number of other narrow unemployed in the household 0.051*** 0.000*** 0.020*** 
 
Sample size (unweighted) 40 116 
***Significant at 1%  ** Significant at 5%  * Significant at 10% 
Reference group: Narrow unemployed 
 
The results showed that in 2011 men had a higher probability of being employed rather than 
unemployed in comparison to women. To be more precise, men were 68 per cent more likely 
to be employed. The probability increased to 104 per cent when taking self-employment into 
account. Men were only 2.1 per cent likely to be discouraged workseekers rather than 
unemployed, compared with women, but this result was statistically insignificant.  
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With regard to race, the probability of white youths being employed rather than unemployed 
was 135.3 per cent higher than for black youths. Indians and coloureds were 64.2 per cent and 
71.2 per cent more likely to be employed compared with black youths respectively. On the 
other hand, white and Indian youths were less likely to be discouraged workseekers, but the 
opposite happened to coloureds when compared with blacks. 
 
The likelihood of the youth labour force being employed in Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal 
and Gauteng provinces was significantly higher than in the Eastern Cape. Furthermore, it is 
interesting that the probability of being self-employed rather than unemployed was 
significantly higher in Gauteng (134.2 per cent) and Mpumalanga (62.0 per cent), but almost 
50 per cent lower in North West, compared with Eastern Cape. The youth labour force 
residing in disadvantaged provinces of North West and Limpopo were associated with a 
greater likelihood of being discouraged workseekers rather than unemployed, compared with 
Eastern Cape. However, the likelihood of being discouraged workseekers was almost 90 per 
cent lower in the Western Cape, almost 40 per cent lower in Gauteng, and more than 50 per 
cent lower in Northern Cape and Free State. These findings confirm the results shown in 
Table A.1. 
 
Being in the ages of 25-29 years (compared to 15-24 years) increased the probability of being 
employed by 77.5 per cent; it also increased the possibility of being self-employed by 89.7 
per cent. In contrast, being aged 25-29 years decreased the chances of being discouraged 
workseekers by about 13.5 per cent. All these results were statistically significant. In addition, 
education had a significant effect on wage employment only for those with at least a Matric 
qualification. Having a Matric, post-Matric certificate/diploma or Bachelor’s degree increased 
the probability of being employed by 16.9 per cent, 44.6 per cent and 63.3 per cent 
respectively. In contrast, a higher educational attainment was associated with a lower 
likelihood of being self-employed or a discouraged workseeker. 
 
Looking at variables relating to an individual’s family background, being married or the head 
of the family increased the chance of being employed by 18.4 per cent and 15.9 per cent 
respectively. However, being the head of the family decreased the odds of being self-
employed by 50.7 per cent, while being married increased the odds of being self- employed 
by 43.4 per cent. Conversely, being the head of the house or married significantly decreased 
the probability of being a discouraged workseeker. 
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The presence of children aged 0-14 years in the household led to an increase of probability of 
being self-employed and employed. However, the probability increase for employment was 
smaller, probably because youths who have child-care responsibilities are less likely to be 
flexible in the labour market; hence they have a lower probability of becoming involved in 
wage employment. On the other hand, the presence of elderly persons (60 years and above) in 
the household did not have a significant effect on youth employment. However, it 
significantly reduced the likelihood of being self-employed by 23.4 per cent, but increased the 
likelihood of being a discouraged workseeker by 14.0 per cent 
 
As the number of other employees in the household (being used as a proxy for a social 
network) increases by one, the result would be a statistically significant increase of likelihood 
of youths being employed by 34.4 per cent, but would lead to a significant decrease of the 
likelihood of being a discouraged workseeker by about 25 per cent. In addition, if the number 
of other self-employed members in the household increases by one, it would result in a 
statistically significant increase of the probability of youths being self-employed by 89.4 per 
cent. This is probably because youths in self-employment are vastly influenced by the 
presence of a family business or a role model from whom they can learn the tactics of self-
employment. Finally, the presence of more other narrow unemployed persons in the 
household is associated with a significant decrease of the likelihood of the youth labour force 
being either employed or discouraged workseekers, rather than being unemployed.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter first reviewed the results of past studies that examined youth labour market 
trends since the advent of democracy before discussing how labour market status was derived 
in each labour survey. All available OHSs, LFSs and QLFSs were then examined to derive 
youth labour market trends between 1995 and 2011 in detail. Although both the LF and 
employment numbers increased after the transition, the increase of the latter was not rapid 
enough to absorb the net labour force entrants, thereby causing both the youth unemployment 
level and the youth unemployment rate to increase. Youths accounted for more than 50% of 
the overall unemployed during the periods under study. The results of the multinomial logistic 
regression showed that gender, race, age, province of residence and family background had a 
significant impact on the likelihood of finding employment. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CAUSES OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Chapter Two highlighted the fact that that youths have been faring relatively poorly in the 
labour market since the transition, as the extent of increases in employment has not been rapid 
enough to absorb the net entrants into the labour market, thereby resulting in an increase in 
unemployment numbers as well as of the unemployment rate, with the increase being the 
greatest in the younger age cohorts. This chapter provides a literature review on the causes of 
youth unemployment from both the supply and demand sides. Section 3.2 discusses the lack 
of mobility and resources among the youths, while Section 3.3 deals with their high 
expectations on how they would fare in the labour market. Section 3.4 looks at the lack of 
experience and soft skills of the youths. Section 3.5 examines the skills mismatch problem, 
while Section 3.6 focuses on how employment and wage inflexibilities aggravate youth 
unemployment. Section 3.7 investigates employment discrimination, while Section 3.8 
examines the failure of the informal sector to generate employment for youths. Section 3.9 
looks at other causes of youth unemployment, before the chapter presents some conlusions in 
Section 3.10. 
 
3.2  Lack of mobility and resources 
 
Many young people, while looking for work, are unable to move or relocate to other areas of 
the country for employment because of financial constraints (Altman 2007:7). In addition, 
some youths are reluctant to take up jobs in rural areas, since they would rather be employed 
in urban areas (Du Toit 2003: 6). However, it is highly unlikely that these youths will find 
employment in urban areas, because of their poor skills and low educational attainment, as 
well as lack of work experience. The outcome is that youths will remain in urban provinces 
such as Gauteng and Western Cape to continuously look for employment. This explains the 
high share of unemployed youths in the more developed provinces (refer to Figure 2.19). 
 
In addition, Mlatsheni (2007: 8) explained that youths lack resources to consistently search 
for employment. When looking for employment, youths incurs costs such as transportation 
costs, printing costs of their CV, as well as internet costs. Most youths are unable to afford 
these costs, hence they become discouraged and stop looking for employment. From Table 
A.1 it can be seen that Limpopo’s share of discouraged youth workseekers is about 19 per 
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cent, thereby indicating that those residing in provinces such as Limpopo are poor and hence 
cannot afford the transport costs to travel to other provinces to seek work (i.e. lack of mobility 
as a constraint). 
 
3.3  High expectations and reservation wage  
 
Rankin and Roberts (2001: 130) stated that youths have high reservation wages, as they 
expect to be paid very high wages once employed and refuse to accept employment that pays 
wages below their expectations. Furthermore, Roberts (2001: 21) asserted that youths have 
high expectations, as they expect to be employed in managerial positions and are reluctant to 
accept entry positions. Ranking and Roberts (2010: 132) examined the South Africa Young 
People Behaviour Survey data conducted in 2006 and found that people with high reservation 
wages and high expectations are more likely to be unemployed. This implies that young 
people should lower their expectations to get employment. 
 
Von Fintel and Black (2007: 5) clarified that wages that are too high lead to unemployment, 
as there will be a disequilibrium between the wage supplied and the wage demand. They 
asserted that youths, the outsiders, may be over-confident and choose high reservation wages, 
while the insiders who are the more experienced workers have reasonable reservation wages 
which are lower than those of outsiders. Therefore youths who overshoot their reservation 
wages reduce their likelihood of employment. 
 
3.4  Lack of experience and soft skills 
 
Youths lack soft skills such communication skills, presentation skills and work readiness, and 
they also lack the ability to compete with older workers (Rees 1986: 620). Smith (2011: 7) 
added that youths lack the basic literacy and numeracy skills that are essential in employment, 
especially among blacks. Smith (2011: 7) attributed this lack of foundational skills to the poor 
quality of education, especially at the former black schools. Barker (2007: 232) used the 
transaction costs model and explained that Africans have their own native language and 
culture. Africans whose first language is Xhosa or Zulu might not work efficiently in 
environment that is primarily English speaking. Furthermore, employers may be reluctant to 
hire Africans because of the additional transaction costs such as the provision of additional 
bridging courses or restructuring the work place to incorporate the difference in cultures and 
language. 
 
 
 
 
  
37 
   
The importance of the English language in the labour market cannot be over-emphasised. 
Casale and Posel (2010: 20) studied the relationship between English proficiency and 
earnings in developing countries. They estimated that people who can read and write English 
very well earned 55 percentage points more than those who do not. Cornwell and Inder (2008: 
24-26) added that Africans who speak English as a home language are 15.8 per cent more 
likely to be employed than those who speak an African language, and found that under both 
definitions of unemployment, the unemployment rate is higher for those who speak an 
African language as their home language in comparison to those who have English as their 
home language. Figure 3.1 below compares the youth narrow unemployment rate of English 
as a home language and an African language as a home language. It can be seen that the youth 
unemployment rate of those with English as a home language is lower than those with an 
African language. 
 
Figure 3.1: Youth narrow unemployment by home language 
Source: Own calculation using the 2008 National Income Dynamics Study data. 
 
Furthermore, parents also have a significant role to play in encouraging and teaching their 
children at home. Louw, Van Der Berg and Yu (2006) showed that the socio-economic status 
of the student’s and parents’ educational attainment have an important role in the educational 
attainment of the students.  There is a positive relationship between socio-economic status of 
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the parent and the learning abilities of the pupil. Pupils whose parents have a high socio-
economic status have a tendency to perform better in school. This may be because learning 
does not stop after school hours, but the pupils take part in learning activities at home. 
 
Youths also lack work experience.  Smith (2005: 8) noted that about 60 per cent of those 
unemployed youths had never worked before; this is because the youths are relatively 
inexperienced, yet the labour legislation makes it difficult to fire permanent staff, so this 
would explain why employers are overly cautious and hesitant to employ youths, whose 
experience and productivity levels are unknown. Altman and Marock (2008: 15) explained 
that early exposure (in terms of work opportunities during studies such internships) to 
employment helps to ease the transition from school to employment. It helps in the 
development of qualities that are desirable for employers such punctuality, reliability, self-
confidence, responsibility and understanding of consumer matters. Furthermore, early 
involvement in the labour market helps youths not only to improve their grades in school but 
also to develop skills such CV writing, building networks and contacts, and development of 
job-searching skills (Altman and Marock 2008:17). Also, Lam, Leibbrandt and Mlatsheni 
(2000: 16) found that those who had worked while in school get better jobs and much more 
quickly than those who did not.  
 
Furthermore, Mlatsheni and Rospabé (2002: 15) argue that employers relate the employment 
of inexperienced youths to be highly risky. This is because inexperienced youths tend to have 
low productivity levels and entail high costs for the employers in terms of training. Pauw, 
Bhorat, Goga, Ncube and Van der Westhuizen (2006: 19) described that, on the one hand, low 
productivity stems from the fact that youths do not possess the skills for the job and hence 
they spend more time learning how to do the work rather that doing it, but on the other hand, 
the high costs are a result of the costs the firm incurs in teaching and training the youths. An 
even greater loss is incurred when the trained youth leaves the job. Therefore, firms that are 
risk averse may shy away from employing young people. 
 
3.5  Skills mismatch 
 
Pauw, Oosthuizen and Van der Westhuizen (2008: 6) clarified that unemployment in South 
Africa is mainly structural, because there is a mismatch between the types of workers 
supplied and those demanded by the labour market. Over the years the South African labour 
market has undergone changes in production and employment as a result of the introduction 
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of new technologies and the increasing use of capital-intensive techniques in production. This 
led to an increasing demand for highly skilled labour. However, there is an oversupply of 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour among youths as already shown in Figures 2.15 and 2.16 in 
Chapter 2. Some of the main factors that influence education or skills level of the LF include 
the quantity of education, the quality of education and the field of education. These are 
discussed in detail below. 
 
3.5.1 Quantity of education 
The human capital theory
15
 assumes that an individual’s future earning streams are positively 
related to years of education. It also assumes that an individual can predict his or her future 
earnings stream (Borjas 2005: 252). However, Lam, Leibbrandt and Mlatsheni (2000:13) 
explain that youths do not have the ability to predict future earnings with accuracy; as a result 
the value of education is unknown to most youths. This has led many youths to drop out of 
school early.  
 
Moreover, Smith (2011: 8) notes many youths in South Africa do not have Matric (see Figure 
2.5 in Chapter 2) because of high drop-out rate. Gustafsson (2011: 17-25) explained that some 
of the reasons for the drop-out rate include;  
 Financial constraints, as many youths do not have the money to acquire books, to pay 
school fees, and buy uniforms and other necessary items;  
 Teenage pregnancies: about 42 per cent of the female drop-out rate is the result of 
pregnancy. Teenage pregnancies have been a serious problem as they increase the 
likelihood of early drop-out;  
 Poor facilities, as some schools are overcrowded with, for example, no desks and no 
proper classrooms;  
 The inability to cope with study regimes. 
 
Smith (2011: 9) emphasised that about 30 per cent of those aged 18 years and older are not 
attending any educational institution. In addition, more than 11 per cent of high school 
children drop out of school each year to join the labour force. These high dropout rates reduce 
the quantity of education for most youths in the labour market and increase their chance of 
being unemployed. Also, Lam, Leibbrandt and Mlatsheni (2000: 15) argued that having 
Matric has a significant and positive effect on the probability of employment, such that 
                                                                
15 Human capital refers to the knowledge and skills available for economic use. These are acquired from 
education and practical experiences (Borjas 2009: 251).  
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educational attainment increases a person’s likelihood of employment. They found that those 
with Matric are 16 percentage points more likely to be employed after school, compared with 
those without Matric. In addition, Altman (2009: 11) found that 81 per cent of discouraged 
workseekers do not have Matric and those with Matric have a 40 to 70 per cent chance of 
formal employment and higher earnings. Furthermore, Table 2.5 in Chapter 2 has already 
confirmed that having at least Matric significantly increases the likelihood of the youths being 
employed. 
 
Burger, Van der Berg and Von Fintel (2012: 20) used school administrative data and 
household survey data to analyse the impact of policies introduced by the Department of 
Education. These policies (introduced in 1998) meant that over-age learners were no longer to 
be allowed in schools and a pupil could not be held back more than once in four schooling 
years. They found that these policies to a large extent increased the drop-out rate and lowered 
the quantity of education. This in turn led to the sudden increase in the youth LF and LFPR in 
the 1990s, but since the youths were very poorly educated, they struggled to find employment 
successfully and they ended up unemployed, thereby causing youth unemployment numbers 
and rates to rise. 
 
3.5.2 Quality of education 
South Africa performs poorly in international tests such as TIMSS
16
 (Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study), PIRLS
17
 (Progress in International Reading and Literacy 
Study) and SACMEQ
18
 (Southern African Consortium Education Quality). Figure B.1 and 
Figure B.2 in Appendix B show the science and mathematics mean scores of TIMSS (2003) 
by country. South Africa ranked at the bottom of the list of the participating countries. Taylor, 
Van der Berg, Reddy and Van Rensburg (2009: 4) explained that both the mathematics and 
science average score were each more than two standard deviations from the international 
average.  Furthermore, results from PIRLS also show that South Africa is ranked at the 
bottom as shown in Figure B.3 in Appendix B. The performance of South Africa in the 
SACMEQ II was just below average, and the country was ranked 8th of 14 participating 
                                                                
16 Taylor, Van der Berg, Reddy and Van Rensburg (2009: 4) explain that the TIMSS tests mathematics and 
science at Grade 4 and Grade 8 in approximately 50 countries all over the world. South Africa has taken part 
three times (in 1995, 1998 and 2003). However, in 2003 South Africa took part only in the tests for Grade 8. 
17 Taylor and Yu (2009: 9) noted that PIRLS test the reading and literacy achievement of primary school 
students. The test is taken at Grade 4 level in about 45 countries all over the world. In South Africa the test was 
conducted at Grade 5 because of the challenging context of multiple languages. 
18 Van der Berg (2008: 10) explains that the SACMEQ II mathematics and reading test took place for Grade 6 
students in 14 southern and eastern African countries, including South Africa. 
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countries. The quality of education in South Africa in comparison to other international 
countries is very low; however, the quality is higher in comparison to other African countries. 
 
In addition, Van der Berg (2008: 149) pointed out that differences in schools (in terms of the 
pupil-teacher ratio, the quality of teaching resources and under-spending by government in 
the historically black schools) to a large extent account for the inequalities in the labour 
market. Moses (2011: 26) explained that the quality of education reflected in cognitive skills 
is very important in determining wages in the market. However, in South Africa some schools 
do not have the resources to provide youths with the necessary cognitive skills, the 
consequence of which is labour market inequalities.  
 
Louw, Van der Berg and Yu (2006: 2) asserted that the history of a school determines its 
quality of education. This means that the quality of matriculants from historically black 
schools is considered lower than that of graduates from historically white schools. For 
example, Pauw, Oosthuizen and Van der Westhuizen (2006: 19) found that 60 per cent of 
those entering universities are functionally illiterate
19
 and most of these students are from 
historically black schools. The historically black schools have poor infrastructure, lack of 
teachers and poor learning facilities (Lam, Leibbrandt and Mlatsheni 2000: 20).   
 
The poor infrastructure is reflected in the lack of desks, boards, few classrooms, which means 
that students are over-crowed in their classes (Moses 2011:12). Furthermore, Clotfelter, Ladd 
and Vigdor (2007: 38) found that teachers have a significantly positive effect on the students’ 
performance. However, Armstrong (2009: 22) explained that there are fewer teachers in the 
historically black schools, to the extent that the student-teacher ratio is significantly higher in 
these schools. Armstrong (2009: 23) further explained that this situation has a negative effect 
on the students that graduate. Lastly, a major problem arises when the teaching method is 
considered. This is because many students are taught in English at school, but speak a 
different language at their homes and elsewhere. This then implies that the student do not 
master their subjects properly.  
 
3.5.3 Field of study 
It is argued that some youths studied in the wrong fields in their post-Matric education. 
Gustafsson (2001: 40) showed that young people in high school do not have the optimal 
combination of subjects. For example, they have too many subjects, which means that they do 
                                                                
19 They are considered functionally illiterate because the fail to comply with the minimum literacy requirements. 
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not have sufficient time to study all of them. The consequence is that the young people fail to 
obtain their Matric Certificate and consequently fail to obtain employment. 
 
Furthermore, Moleke (2005: 10) pointed out that there is an oversupply of graduates from the 
humanities and arts, resulting in youth unemployment. The Business Leadership Research 
Report (2006: 14-16) confirmed that a lot of young people enrol in the humanities because of 
the less stringent entrance requirements. However, the report showed that about 60 per cent of 
the graduates from the economic and management science found work immediately after 
graduation. In addition, Moleke (2005: 12) also showed that 80 and 90 per cent of graduates 
from engineering and medical sciences respectively obtain employment immediately after 
school. Therefore, it is evident that there is an oversupply of humanities graduates, while 
graduates from engineering and medical sciences are undersupplied. 
 
Pauw, Bhorat, Goga, Ncube, Van der Westhuizen (2006: 8) showed that unemployment is 
highest among youths holding a certificate or diploma in comparison to those with degrees. 
About 82 people of the certificate and diploma holders were unemployed in 2005 in 
comparison to only 18 per cent for degree holders. However, they also found out that the 
quality of the post-Matric certificate or diploma from institutions, especially the historically 
black institutions, is unknown and therefore employers are hesitant to employ these graduates. 
 
3.6  Labour legislation 
 
It is argued that the current South Africa labour market legislation act as a barrier against 
employment creation, especially for youths. These rigidities created by legislation are 
discussed in detail in this section. 
 
3.6.1 Rigid labour legislation 
Levinsohn (2008: 9) reported that South Africa’s labour legislation is ranked amongst the 
most restrictive in the world. The new legislation implemented since the transition (such as 
Basic Condition of Employment Act, Employment Equity Act) is rigid and contributes to the 
high rate of youth unemployment (Robert 2011: 25). Sources of rigid legislation include 
legislation on dismissals, biased labour practices, fixed-term contracts, wages, and the time 
and cost it takes to fire unproductive workers. 
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In addition, Levinsohn (2008: 10) emphasised that rigid employment legislation has caused 
many firms to shy away from employing inexperienced youths, because the laws make it 
expensive for firms to retrench non-performing employees. The low productivity of non-
performing workers may discourage employers from hiring inexperienced young people. 
 
The labour market legislation makes it difficult for employers to hire inexperienced young 
people, because it increases the costs to the firm hence it acts like a barrier to youth 
employment. Smith (2011: 29) suggested that it is imperative for the labour legislation to be 
loosened so as to facilitate the entry of youths into the labour market and also have access to 
employment opportunities. 
 
3.6.2  Collective bargaining and minimum wage 
Nattrass (2000: 145) explicated that the collective bargaining system has an extension 
principle. The principle asserts that the minimum wage agreements between trade unions and 
employer organisations are legally binding on firms that did not participate in the negotiations 
across the industry concerned, provided the trade unions concerned represent at least 50 per 
cent of the workers in the industry. This means that all firms in the labour market, regardless 
of their participatory status in their wage agreements, must adhere to the minimum wage 
agreements. The firms in the labour market can further be sub-divided into large and small 
firms. The extension principle therefore has different effects on the firms. The large firms in 
the market are more capital intensive; hence they produce more, earning higher profits and 
could afford to pay higher wages to employees. On the other hand, small firms are more 
labour intensive and produce on small scale with less profit, hence paying lower wages.  
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the extension of collective bargaining agreements affects large and 
small firms. Since larger firms could afford to pay higher minimum wages and are dominant 
in the market, it is possible they will have the highest representation in trade unions. The 
minimum wage agreed upon in the bargaining council meetings is too high and can only be 
paid by larger firms. On the other hand, small firms are labour intensive and are unable to 
afford the high agreed-upon minimum wage. Therefore, in a quest to reduce cost, they either 
cut down employment or lay off people in order to manage the higher wages agreed upon. 
The worst possible scenario is that some small firms simply close down (because the 
minimum wage is too high), thereby seriously worsening unemployment, including youth 
unemployment. Von Fintel and Burger (2009: 5) asserted that youths have a higher likelihood 
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of being retrenched in cases where firms need to downsize and when firms won’t hire labour, 
leading to youth unemployment. 
 
Figure 3.2: The impact of the extension principle on non-party firms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nattrass (2000: 136) 
 
Furthermore, the impact of minimum wage agreements could be explained with aid of 
Figure 3.3. The market-clearing wage is set at W0 where L0 are employed. However, with the 
imposition the minimum wage W1, which is above the equilibrium wage, only L1 are 
employed. The number of the youths unemployed is the difference between LS and L1.  In the 
long run small firms will shut down or leave the market, because it will no longer be 
profitable to be in the market as cost (in terms of wages) will increase and the demand will 
shift to D2 from D1 and youth employment declines to L2, thereby resulting in a rise in youth 
unemployment from (LS – L1) to (LS – L2). 
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Figure 3.3: Potential impact of minimum wage on youth employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minimum wages 
 
3.6.3  Insider-outsider theory 
Von Fintel and Burger (2009: 35) explained that there is an asymmetry of desire between 
those who are already employed in the labour market (insiders) and those who are 
unemployed (outsiders). The imposition of rigid minimum wages leads to unemployment, 
especially youth unemployment, because the insiders want high wages while the outsiders are 
willing to accept lower wages to be employed. However, only the desires of the insiders are 
represented by trade unions who bargain for higher wages; therefore firms refrain from hiring 
outsiders, thereby causing (youth) unemployment to increase. With reference to Figure 3.3 
above, at a wage of W2 there is LS2 labour supplied. This implies that some of the new entrants 
to the labour market (outsiders) do not mind being paid a wage (W2) that is below the 
minimum wage (W1); unfortunately the employers cannot employ them because they must 
adhere to the regulation of the agreed-upon of the minimum wage of W1.  
 
Apart from the insider-outsider theory, the minimum wage has the effect of raising the cost of 
the labour to a firm. In the worst case it could be complemented by an increase of capital cost. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates that, in the left panel, the increase in the cost of capital (e.g. due to a 
higher price of imported equipment as a result of the weakening rand and the Eskom price 
hikes in recent years), along with higher minimum wage, causes firms to decrease output (i.e. 
production decreases from Q1 to Q2). As a result, the number of employed decreases from L1 
to L2, as shown in the right panel of Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Potential impact of increased input costs on employment 
 
 
3.7  Employment discrimination 
 
Mlatsheni and Rospabé (2002) explained that employer discrimination is another reason for 
youth unemployment. Employers have a tendency to discriminate against younger workers. 
These authors used the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
20
 and showed that 27 per cent of the 
mean employment probability difference between youths and adults is accounted for by the 
unexplained component. 
 
Moleke (2005: 12) also found that 43 per cent of the difference between white and black 
youth employment is due to the unexplained component. Furthermore, 73 per cent of the 
employment differences between men and women were unexplained. Affirmative Action laws 
such as Black Economic Empowerment and the Employment Equity Act have been 
introduced to redress the problem of discrimination. However, Burger and Jafta (2006: 19) 
asserted that Affirmative Action laws have not been successful in reducing discriminatory 
hiring, revealed in the fact that the unexplained component did not show any downward trend.  
 
  
                                                                
20 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is a technique that is used to divide the differences in wages or employment. It 
decomposes the total difference between the explained and unexplained component. The explained component is 
the part of the total difference that accrues to the differences in skills, while the unexplained component contains 
elements of discrimination (Borjas 2009: 337).  
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3.8  Failure of informal sector to generate temporary employment for youths 
 
South Africa is regarded as a country with a high unemployment rate but a small informal 
sector (Kingdon and Knight, 2007: 6). O’Higgins (1997: 23) argued that the youths who are 
unable to find employment in the formal sector could turn to the informal sector as a means of 
survival. However, Kingdon and Knight (2007: 20) explained that youths face a number of 
problems that hinder them from entering the informal sector. They stated that these problems 
include:  
 Lack of access to infrastructure and services;  youths do not have access to services 
that help them develop themselves in the informal sector; 
 Lack of provision of training facilities; such training facilities would teach 
unemployed youths how to start a business or work for one self; 
 Lack of credit; to survive in the informal sector one needs credit; however, youths do 
not have access to credit, nor do they have the capital with which to survive in the 
informal sector; 
 Lack of provision of market access and business programmes.  
 
Likewise, Kingdon and Knight (2007:18) state that those relatively uneducated and 
inexperienced youths who fail to find employment in the formal sector could try to survive by 
becoming involved in informal sector activities. However, the aforementioned to barriers of 
entry to the informal sector and the lack of government support for informal and micro-
enterprises slow down the possible youth employment creation role of the informal sector. 
 
Rogerson (2004: 9), in his assessment of the government support to small, medium and 
micro-enterprises (SMMEs), argued that allocation of funding for SMMEs was biased 
towards already existing white-owned SMMEs instead of the incipient small enterprises in the 
informal sector between 1994 and 2003. Rogerson (2004: 6) concluded that there was little 
government support for small surviving firms, women-owned enterprises and rural SMMEs. 
Devey, Skinner and Valodia (2006: 14) bemoaned the lack of government support for the 
training of informal sector workers. They explained that the Sector Education and Training 
Authorities (SETA) prioritised the needs of those contributing to the skills levy (from which 
their funds emanate), i.e. the formal businesses. Furthermore, The National Skills Fund (NSF) 
is reluctant to train people in the informal sector because of the lack of profitability, the low 
levels of education of the workers, and difficulties incurred when trying to have access to the 
informal sector workers (Devey, Skinner and Valodia 2006: 15).  
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3.9  Other causes of youth unemployment 
 
3.9.1  Economic recession 
Economic recession occurs when there is a slow rate of production and low demand. In a 
quest to maintain their profits and cut costs, firms then retrench employees (Mlatsheni and 
Rospabé 2002: 38). Usually youths are the first to go, because they are inexperienced and 
have low productivity levels. Figure 3.4 shows that the employment elasticity
21
 of youths is 
the lowest in comparison to other age cohorts, showing that youths benefit least from 
economic growth and during a recession youths are still the worst affected. The employment 
elasticity reveals that a 1 per cent increase in economic growth will result in 0.46 per cent rise 
in youth employment. Even though the youth employment elasticity is smallest for youths, it 
is still positive, which implies that economic growth will have a positive impact on youth 
employment. On the other hand, the elasticity coefficient is greater than 1 only in the 55-65 
years cohort. This might be because these elderly are more experienced and permanently 
employed, and hence they are likely to survive even during economic recession. 
 
Figure 3.5: Employment elasticity by age cohort, OHS 1995 vs. QLFS 2011Q4 
Source: Own calculation using OHS 1995 and QLFS 2011Q4 employment data, and real Gross Domestic 
Product data from the Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank. 
 
                                                                
21  The employment elasticity is given as: percentage change employment / percentage change real GDP.  
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Von Fintel and Burger (2009: 38) explained that the global recession which started in United 
States of America in 2008, caused employment in South Africa to drop between 2008Q2 and 
2010Q2. The reduction in global demand resulted in the lowering of South Africa’s export-
reducing production. This then led firms not to employ but also to retrench youths, hence 
escalating the youth unemployment problem. Table 3.1 below shows that the fall in 
employment between QLFS 2008Q2 and QLFS 2010Q2 was largest among the youth. 
Furthermore, the highest percentage decline of employment was in the younger age cohort at 
14 per cent. 
 
Table 3.1: Number of employed in each age cohort, QLFS 2008Q2 vs. QLFS 2010Q2 
 18-29 years 30-34 years 35-44 years 45-54 years 55-65 years 
QLFS 2008Q2 3 892 136 2 394 627 3 616 983 2 611 341 1 153 500 
QLFS 2010Q2 3 336 444 2 214 421 3 562 538 2 509 154 1 122 379 
Difference -555 692 -180 206 -54 445 -102 187 -31 121 
% change -14.3% -7.5% -1.5% -3.9% -2.7% 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2008Q2 and QLFS 2010Q2 data. 
 
3.9.2  High HIV/AIDS infection rates 
Arndt and Lewis (2000: 380) stated that HIV/AIDS infection rate was highest amongst the 
young population, as shown in Figure 3.6. They estimate that people in the age cohort 25 to 
45 years are more likely to contract AIDS. In addition, Stats SA Release (2010: 6) estimated 
that more than 50 per cent of the HIV-positive population is in the age cohort 15 to 35 years. 
 
Figure 3.6: HIV prevalence rate by age cohort, 2008
Source: South African National HIV Survey (2008) 
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Horton (2005: 121) argued that the negative impact of the HIV pandemic on youth 
unemployment cannot be over-emphasised. The disease lowers an individual’s productivity as 
a result of absenteeism from work to get treatment or to take care of the sick. Furthermore, 
Laubscher, Visagie and Smit (2001: 25) explained that employees don’t work to their full 
potential as their bodies are weak because of the disease.  However, it is unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate on the basis of ones’ health; hence employers may be reluctant to 
employ youths because it is they are at the age with highest infection rate.  
 
3.9.3  Failure of the Expanded Public Works Programme 
The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), as described by McCord and Meth (2009: 
44), was designed to help curb the escalating problem of unemployment. The programme was 
aimed at providing short- and medium-term employment. In phase 1 the EPWP provided 
approximately 1.6 million jobs and phase 2, which was implemented in 2009, is expected to 
create more employment opportunities. But the National Treasury (2011: 22) has criticised 
the EPWP because it has not been too successful in boosting youth employment. It is argued 
that the short duration of the programme, the law labour strictures and the lack of training 
among participants increased the cost per job. Furthermore, Altman (2007: 15) states that the 
jobs provided by the EPWP are short term, in the rural areas and are gender-biased (towards 
men), because they are inherently based on community service delivery. 
 
3.10  Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the major causes of youth unemployment. The discussion noted that 
youths lack the workplace readiness and communication skills, and have high expectation 
which hinders the likelihood of their employment. The chapter also discussed skills mismatch 
by explaining that the quality and quantity of education as well as the field of study has a 
significant effect on the likelihood of youth employment. Labour market legislation, such as 
extension principle, negatively affects the small labour-intensive firms and escalates the youth 
unemployment problem, the minimum wage also has an adverse effect on youth 
unemployment. Other factors accounting for youth unemployment include the failure of the 
informal sector to provide a cushion for unemployed youths who failed to find formal 
employment. The economic recession had a significant negative impact on youth 
employment, since they have the lowest employment elasticity. Also, there is a high HIV 
infection rate among young people, which makes them weak and unfit for work, and finally it 
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is argued that the Expanded Public Works Programme fails to address the unemployment 
problem. These factors have escalated the youth unemployment problem and hence there is 
cause for alarm. Therefore the youth wage subsidy has been suggested as one of the policy 
options to solve the youth unemployment problem. This is the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: YOUTH WAGE SUBSIDY AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO 
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Three highlighted some of the major causes of youth unemployment from the 
demand and supply sides. This chapter will discuss policies that can help reduce youth 
unemployment, with the focus on the youth wage subsidy. Section 4.2 discusses the possible 
policy options to solve the youth unemployment problem, while Section 4.3 focuses 
exclusively on the youth wage subsidy programme. Section 4.3.1 first looks at how the 
proposed subsidy programme will work in South Africa, before Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 
discuss the arguments for and against the subsidy. Section 4.3.4 looks at international 
experiences of a subsidy programme, before Section 4.4 offers some conclusions. 
 
4.2 Possible policy options to solve youth unemployment 
 
As seen in Figure 4.1, labour market policies can be divided into passive labour market 
policies (PLMPs) and active labour market policies (ALMPs). Meth (2009: 6) explained that 
passive policies are those that do not require the direct involvement of an individual in wage 
employment, e.g. unemployment insurance funds and basic income grants. These passive 
labour market policies are intended to mitigate the financial hardships of the unemployed; 
however, the policies are not effective in reducing unemployment. On the other hand, active 
policies aim to increase employment opportunities for job seekers as well as to bridge the gap 
between the jobs available and the qualified employees (Meth 2009: 7). The active policies 
can be further sub-divided into supply-side measure and demand-side measures. Evans-
Knock, Kelly, Richards and Vargha (1998: 20) noted that supply-side measures such as job 
search assistance (i.e. a job search subsidy) and job retention are intended to reduce the length 
of unemployment after a job loss as well as improve the likelihood that replacement jobs will 
require similar skill levels and have similar earning potential. Furthermore, demand-measures 
aim to increase employment creation through measures such as public employment 
programmes (e.g. the Expanded Public Works Programme), employment subsidy (e.g. the 
youth wage subsidy), promotion of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and policies that 
focus on area-based economic renewal. Some of these policies are discussed in greater detail 
in this section. 
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Figure 4.1:  Labour market policy options 
 
 
Job search subsidy 
A job search subsidy is intended to cover or subsidise the costs associated with searching for a 
job. These costs include transportation costs, printing costs and internet costs. Rankin (2013: 
3) stated that the job search subsidy could help to decrease unemployment. In addition, the 
job seekers would be more willing to accept lower wages, because the job search subsidy has 
reduced the job search costs.  
 
Furthermore, employment service such as job search courses and job clubs can also be used as 
a measure to lower the youth unemployment rate. This may help solving the problem of lack 
of resources and mobility as mentioned in Chapter 3. 
 
Training scheme 
The aim of a training scheme is to improve and enhance the skills of youths and hence 
increase human capital (Guma 2011: 17). Training schemes can be administered through two 
broad categories, namely policies that are designed to develop the basic skills necessary for 
job readiness, and specific vocational training programmes by a specific industry (e.g. EPWP) 
(Archer 2008: 15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Labour 
market 
policies Active 
Policies 
Passive 
Policies 
Supply-side 
measures 
Demand-
side 
measures 
Job search 
assistance 
Job 
retraining 
Public 
Employment 
program 
Employment 
subsidy (i.e. 
youth wage 
subsidy) 
Promotion of 
Small and 
Medium 
enterprises 
Area based 
economic 
development 
Basic 
Income 
grant 
Unemployment 
Insurance fund 
 
 
 
 
  
54 
The National Treasury (2011: 25) asserted that the advantage of training schemes is that the 
skills acquired increase the employability of youths. However, these programmes are costly 
and take a long time to materialise and finally impact on the economy (Rosas and Rossignotti, 
2005: 152). Kolev and Saget (2005: 181) suggest that a training schemes policy should be 
implemented as a complement to another policy, as on its own it does not produce positive 
results. 
 
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
The EPWP is another policy that can be used to reduce youth unemployment. The aim of the 
programme is to keep the most discouraged workers within the labour market and is more 
effective when implemented in the short term (Kolev and Saget, 2005: 181).  
 
It has the benefit that it includes all the youths in the labour market who gain labour market 
attachment; it can develop infrastructure if coupled with development strategies, and if 
combined with training schemes it can enhance youth employability (Rosas and Rossignotti, 
2005: 152). On the other hand, the disadvantage of a public works programme include the 
notion that it is usually gender-biased, it displaces private sector companies, it has a low 
capacity for labour market integration, and it may lead to youths being trapped in a cycle of 
temporary public works (Rosas and Rossignotti, 2005: 154).  
 
Training layoff scheme 
Another viable active policy that could be used to counter the adverse effects of a recession is 
the Training Layoff Scheme (TLS). TLS, formally introduced by the Commission of 
Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation (CCMA) in 2009, entails the voluntary placement of 
workers on training for a short period and pays those workers 75 per cent of their wage bill 
(Department of Labour 2012: 4). The training layoff scheme is funded by Skills Education 
Training Authority and National Skills Fund (NSF). 
 
The advantage is that both the employer and the worker gain, as the employer saves on the 
wage bill and the worker avoids retrenchment (Daphne and Everett, 2011: 6). However, the 
scheme is still not well known to the unions, workers and employers. It also entails a long 
bureaucratic process which is cumbersome and complicated, because it has many role players 
and requires many different levels of approval.  
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For example, to participate in the TLS, a firm has to spend time to submit the necessary 
documentation to CCMA to prove that the business is in financial distress. Thereafter the 
CCMA applies for training funding on behalf of the firm from SETA and NSF. The result of 
the many role players is the associated internal delays. When the application is finally 
approved, the firm may have either closed down (due to the financial distress) or no longer 
needs to take part in the TLS due to improvement of the business condition. 
 
Tax relief 
Tax relief for small labour-intensive firms is a policy that has been used to help stimulate 
employment. The tax relief helps to decrease the cost of the small labour-intensive firms; 
hence the firms can employ more labour (ILO 2009c: 34). This helps to counter the problem 
raised in Section 3.6. As a result of the tax relief, the small labour-intensive firms could then 
afford to pay the minimum wage instead of firing or not employing youths. 
 
Stipend-paid volunteer 
Stipend-paid volunteer is another possible active policy where youths volunteer for low-
income paid jobs instead being idle. A stipend-paid volunteer is a person who volunteers to 
engage in formal work service activities to provide assistance to people they do not know for 
financial compensation that is market related (Tschirhart, Mesch, Perry, Miller and Lee 2001: 
1). 
 
Tschirhart et al. (2001: 10) point out that the benefit of the stipend-paid volunteer policy is 
that the jobs provide opportunities as well as training and experience. This helps alleviate the 
problem of lack of experience mentioned in Section 3.4. However, the stipend-paid volunteer 
policy faces the challenge of low remuneration, minimal support and emotional stress arising 
from the low income. 
 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
The important of SMEs to youth employment creation cannot be over-emphasised. This is 
because SMEs provide an alternative form of employment for youths who have not been 
employed in the formal sector (Biggs 2002: 5).   
 
It is therefore imperative to boost the growth of SMEs and one way of doing this is through 
the introduction of a wage subsidy targeted specifically at SMEs. The subsidy would be 
aimed at reducing the cost of borrowing and the acquisition of inputs (Biggs 2002: 18).  With 
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lower costs more youths will be employed and, more important, some may be motivated to 
start small businesses themselves.  
 
Part-time work, shorter hours and wage freeze 
As an alternative to retrenchment, Daphne and Everett (2011: 9) suggested that youths be 
employed on a part-time basis. This ensures that the youths are working and earn a wage 
instead of being completely unemployed. Furthermore, youths could have reduced hours of 
work, i.e. working for less than forty hours a week, instead of being retrenched. This ensures 
that youths are still kept in employment even during a recession. Another alternative would be 
to freeze the real wage so that the firms do not incur higher costs. However, these strategies 
are difficult to implement as they are strongly opposed by the trade unions. 
 
Table 4.1 below shows possible labour market policies to increase employment in each group 
of the youth labour force. From the discussion above it seems that some of the policies are 
particularly suited to a certain group of the youth labour force. Policies that aim at reducing 
unemployment include the youth wage subsidy, the EPWP and encouraging SMMEs. Policies 
on stipend-paid volunteers, the EPWP and the job search subsidy aim to inspire discouraged 
workseekers to look for employment. Finally, for youths who are employed but easily 
retrenched, policies on a training layoff scheme, part-time work, shorter working hours and a 
wage freeze could be implemented to keep these youth employed even during a recession. 
 
Table 4.1: Possible labour market policies to increase employment in each group of youth labour force 
Policy 
Outsiders Insiders 
Narrowed 
unemployed 
Discouraged 
workseekers 
Current employed 
(who might be 
retrenched) 
Reduce work hours    
Reduce wage    
Youth wage subsidy    
Job search subsidy    
Better career guidance    
Expanded public works program    
Stipend paid volunteer    
Training layoff scheme    
Freeze real wage    
 
4.3 Youth wage subsidy 
 
As shown in Table 2.4, youths account for a larger proportion of the unemployed, which in 
turn implies that they are more likely to be marginalised. Not only are unemployed youths 
 
 
 
 
  
57 
unable to acquire the necessary skills to enhance their future productivity, they also reduce 
their future employment prospects. Altman (2007:3) showed that the longer the length of a 
youth’s period of unemployment, the more difficult it will be to find a job. This may lead to 
youths losing their sense of self-worth and eventually lead their engaging in activities such as 
crime and sexual exploitation. 
 
In South Africa the National Treasury (2011: 33) stated that policy makers have suggested the 
introduction of a youth wage subsidy, which was supposed to be implemented from 1 April 
2012. The proposition of the youth wage subsidy was strongly opposed by COSATU and 
other members of the public. Consequently, it has still not been implemented at the time of 
writing. South Africa would have been the first African country to implement such a youth 
wage subsidy. However, other countries in the world have implemented the subsidy in the 
past, with the specific aim of curbing youth unemployment. 
 
The subsidy will be a firm-side subsidy provided to the employer. It is expected to reduce the 
cost of labour relative to other inputs. The subsidy which will be provided to the employer 
will act as an incentive to employ youths. It will be administered through the Pay As You 
Earn (PAYE) tax system that is run by the South African Revenue Service. Moreover, the 
subsidy will be in form of a cash reimbursement to employers who employ eligible candidates 
(Burn, Edward and Pauw 2010:6). This section first aims to explain how the youth wage 
subsidy works before discussing the potential merits and drawbacks of the subsidy.  
 
4.3.1 How it will work in South Africa 
The subsidy, which will be a firm-side subsidy, will target youths who are full-time workers 
in the age group 15 to 29 years who work not less than 35 hours per week.  Only PAYE-
registered business will be eligible for the youth wage subsidy, excluding central and 
provincial governments. Furthermore, only new workers aged between 18 and 29 years, as 
well as existing workers aged between 18 and 24 years who earn below the personal income-
tax threshold of R60 000 per annum, will be eligible, with eligibility commencing on the date 
of the worker’s 18th birthday and concluding on the last day of their 24th or 29th year. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the amount of the subsidy for each income level.  For existing workers, a 
maximum subsidy of R6 000 per annum is paid for those earning R24 000 per annum. (The 
subsidy is reflected as 25 per cent of the recipients’ income in Figure 4.4.)  After that the 
subsidy will decrease for each increasing salary until it reaches R0 for a salary of R60 000 per 
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annum. The duration of the subsidy for existing workers is 1 year. However, for newly 
employed workers the length of the subsidy is 2 years.  In the first year the maximum amount 
of the subsidy is R12 000 per annum for a salary of R24 000 (which amounts to 50 per cent of 
the salary).  Then the subsidy will fall until it reaches R0 for the salary of R60 000 per annum. 
 
Figure 4.3: Youth employment subsidy at each salary level (rands, annual amounts) 
 
 
Figure 4.4:  Youth employment subsidy as proportion of salary at each annual salary level
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The subsidy will be administered through the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) tax system that is run 
by the South African Revenue Service. The subsidy will be in form of a cash reimbursement 
to employers who employ eligible candidates (Burn, Edward and Pauw 2010: 6); the 
following options are available: 
 Employers pay the net balance of PAYE tax and subsidy every six months; 
 Employers pay the net balance of PAYE tax and subsidy on monthly basis and reconcile 
every six months; 
 SARS collects PAYE tax as usual, cash flows every six months and allows for a tax 
credit or rebate for the value of the subsidy. 
  
The subsidy is expected to subsidise 423 000 new jobs at a cost of approximately R5 billion 
to the government over a period of three years and has an estimated deadweight loss of 
112 000 jobs with a corresponding cost of R11 800 per job (National Treasury 2011: 39). 
Employment gains are expected to be highest in retail and catering, building and construction, 
as well as food and agriculture, because the minimum wage is low in these sectors. 
 
4.3.2 Arguments for the subsidy programme 
Guma (2011: 6) argued that a youth wage subsidy would decrease the cost to a firm of 
employing a youth, which would increase youth employment as well as the productivity of 
youths. Costs of labour such minimum wages would be minimised for a firm, hence 
improving the levels of employment. In addition to the reduction in costs, the youth wage 
subsidy would enable youths to gain work experience and other skills relevant for 
employment (Crichton and Mayer, 2012: 26). Mothabi (2011: 3) reported that the wage 
subsidy increases the labour productivity as the employers could use the subsidy to promote 
training and education opportunities for the young workers. With the incentive that 
compensation will be offered in the form of subsidy for employing and training a youth, more 
firms will be encouraged to employ youths and train them, hence increasing their productivity 
levels in the long run. 
 
Young and elderly workers can be considered as complements in the labour market. The idea 
is that the implementation of a wage subsidy will increase the labour force participation. 
Crichton and Mayer (2012: 27) added that in a labour market where youths and elderly people 
are seen as complements, the introduction of a youth wage subsidy will not only boost labour 
demand for youths, but also boost the labour demand for the elderly, because the experienced 
elderly are required to be leaders to provide guidance to the inexperienced youth workers. 
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Figure 4.5: Potential impact of youth wage subsidy on youths and adults, if they are complements 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 above graphically illustrates what would happen in the labour market of both 
youths and adults as complements. The wage subsidy will increase the demand for youths as 
shown by a shift in the demand curve in graph A. Youth employment will increase from L1 to 
L2 at the new equilibrium. In addition, since youths and adults are complements, the demand 
for adult workers will also increase and the demand curve will shift to D2, as shown in graph 
B. Adult employment also increases from L1 to L2. Moreover, the increase in employment of 
youths and adults would provide more earnings for poor families and eventually alleviate 
poverty and inequality in the economy and reduce reliance on social grants (Yu, 2012: 7). 
 
Section 3.5 showed that skill mismatch is one of the major causes of youth unemployment. 
The youth wage subsidy could help bridge the gap between skills demanded by the employers 
and those supplied by youths by improving the quality of youths’ skills in the labour market 
through the acquisition of knowledge while at the work place (Pauw, Oosthuizen and Van der 
Westhuizen, 2008: 6). Furthermore, the subsidy would decrease the risk associated with 
employing inexperienced young people. In addition, the subsidy would aid in combatting 
structural unemployment without an adverse effect on productivity, competition and 
employment (Kearney, Korman and Robinson 2009: 15). This is because the wage subsidy 
would affect labour demand directly and increase youth employment as well as decrease the 
proportion of the working poor in the long run. 
 
The wage subsidy helps to target job creation directly, thereby increasing demand (National 
Treasury Discussion Paper 2011: 28). The wage subsidy is a direct measure that will directly 
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increase the demand for labour in the short run especially. Figure 4.6 depicts the potential 
impact of the implementation of the proposed youth wage subsidy. The subsidy will directly 
increase demand by firms, shown by a shift in the demand curve from D1 to D2, and a new 
equilibrium is set at point B.  At equilibrium B the number of youths employed increases to L2 
and the annual salary also increases from W1 to W2.  
 
Figure 4.6: Potential impact of youth wage subsidy on youth employment   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subsidy would help improve job security; to be eligible for the subsidy one has to be a 
PAYE-registered worker and work at least 35 hours a week. The youths would no longer be 
subjected to work on a part-time basis or on contract, but would have secure full-time jobs. 
Furthermore, as a result of the increased likelihood of obtaining employment, youths will be 
more encouraged to participate in job searching activities. This would reduce their likelihood 
of engaging in crime and other violent activities (Yu 2012: 12). 
 
4.3.3 Arguments against the subsidy programme 
Guma (2011: 4) expressed the concern that the youth subsidy would not deal with the 
underlying causes of youth unemployment such as lack of education and the quality of 
education as discussed in Section 3.5. The subsidy would increase the demand for labour, but 
does not improve the quality of the supply of labour. Mothabi (2011: 4) explained that the 
lack of skills, education and experience are some of the underlying factors that cause youth 
unemployment. However, these are not covered by the youth wage subsidy. In addition, 
Guma (2011: 4) argued that a competitive market will reach equilibrium where demand for 
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labour is equal to supply of labour. The excess supply would then be a result of market 
rigidities which must be revised or removed, instead of implementing a wage subsidy. 
 
The National Treasury (2011: 5) stated that the subsidy is not sufficient to maintain the job 
performance of youths, but merely increases the chances of a youth becoming employed. This 
is because the wage subsidy will run for only one year, after which the youths are left to find 
full-time employment (Burns et al., 2011: 3).  
 
In a labour market where youths and adults are considered to be substitutes, the wage subsidy 
would also have substitution effect. An employer would choose to employ a subsidised youth 
(to benefit from the subsidy) and dismiss elderly workers (Burn et al. 2011: 3). This one of 
the mains reason COSATU (2012: 23) has strongly opposed the introduction of the youth 
wage subsidy. The overall employment level would remain the same, since youth 
employment increases but non-youth employed decreases. Figure 4.7 below graphically 
illustrates the impact of the wage subsidy when youths and adults are considered to be 
substitutes.  When the youth subsidy is implemented, the demand for youths will increase as 
shown by a shift in the demand curve in Graph A and youth employment increases. Since 
youths and adults are substitutes, the demand for adult labour will decrease, shown by a 
leftward shift in the demand curve in Graph B and hence adult employment decreases.  
 
Figure 4.7: Potential impact of youth wage subsidy on youths and adults (substitutes) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
  
 
 
Burn et al (2011: 3) explain that the youth wage subsidy may lead to a churning effect. This 
occurs where old subsided youths are substituted for new subsidised youths. For example, a 
youth who qualified for the subsidy and was employed for a year could be fired and replaced 
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by a newly subsidised youth. The wage subsidy must be properly monitored if this churning 
effect is to be avoided.  In addition, Guma (2011: 4) noted that the subsidy would put more 
pressure on the government to raise finances to maintain the subsidy. The government will 
have to raise funds by reprioritising the budget or by increasing taxes so as to finance and 
maintain equilibrium. Burns et al. (2011: 4) argue that the funds that are cut from the social 
grants budget, together with the increased taxes, may lead to an increase in crime which 
counters the impact of the subsidy. 
 
Richardson (1998: 15) argued that the success of a wage subsidy is highly dependent upon the 
nature of the market. If the market is highly competitive, then firms will have an incentive to 
employ youths. However, if the level of competitiveness is low then firms have no incentive 
to increase employment or reduce the output prices. Yu (2012: 14) explains that the wage 
subsidy may lead to fraud and increase administrative cost. An employer may register some 
of his/her friends who may not qualify for the subsidy in order to benefit from it. Furthermore, 
the subsidy would entail regular reports, which are time consuming and increase 
administrative costs. 
 
4.3.4 International experiences of the subsidy programme 
The youth wage subsidy has been implemented in some countries around the world such as 
Singapore, Turkey, United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, Australia, Uruguay, United States of 
America and Canada. No African country has implemented the youth wage subsidy. In 
analysing the international experience of such a subsidy, especially the firm side, we will 
focus on the experience of four countries: Australia, Chile, Argentina and the United 
Kingdom.  Burns et al. (2010: 15) noted that the success of the subsidy is highly associated 
with the structure of the market. 
 
Australia 
Australia implemented a wage subsidy programme called the Special Youth Employment 
Training Programme (ASYETP) in 1976. The programme was designed to address the 
problem of high youth unemployment rates. The Australian government introduced the 
subsidy to target teenagers who were unemployed for a period of four months or more. 
However, the subsidy was later broadened to incorporate any youths between the ages of 15 
and 24 years (Richardson, 1998: 4). 
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The subsidy was paid as a flat rate so that the proportion of low wage workers was greater. 
Employers were offered a subsidy of A$75 per week for 17 weeks, which was levied for 50 
per cent of teenage wages.   Richardson (1998: 4) noted that the ASYETP provided a subsidy 
of A$100 for 17 weeks to eligible candidates and a further A$75 for another 17 weeks to 
employers who hired youth between the ages of 18 and 24 years who had been unemployed 
for a minimum of 8 months.  
 
Richardson (1998: 21) reported that the ASYETP was successful as a work experience 
programme, as it aided youths to acquire the relevant work experience and work-place skills. 
The acquisition of work experience increased the probability of employment within 8 and 13 
months of training by 26 per cent after expiry. It further increases the probability of finding a 
job within 14 and 26 months by 26 per cent after expiry.  The ASEYTP was reported to not 
have any substitution effects between existing workers and subsidised workers. Australia 
gained 100 per cent from the implementation of the subsidy.   
 
Knight (2002:  254) attributed the success of the ASYETP to the fact that Australia had high 
levels of school participation despite the youth unemployment problem. This meant there was 
a high proportion of youths who were educated and highly skilled. In addition, Australia was 
not faced with rigid labour market legislation; for example, the youth minimum wage was 
lower than for adults (youths received about 50 to 60 per cent of adult wages). This legislation 
lowered youth labour costs, hence increased youth employment. However, South Africa is 
constrained with rigid labour legislation, lack of education, and a high level of unskilled 
labour, which could render the youth wage subsidy unsuccessful. 
 
Chile 
Chile experienced high unemployment rates as a result of skills mismatch (Smith 2006: 18). 
To try and curb the theses high unemployment rates the Chilean government introduced a 
wage subsidy called the Chile Joven. The subsidy was aimed at training the youths through 
apprenticeship programmes (Inter-Regional Inequality Facility, 2006: 1).  
 
The Chile Joven was instigated in 1991 with the view to train 100 000 unemployed youths 
between the ages of 15 and 24 years. This subsidy was supposed to run for a period of four 
months and it was in the form of compensation to employers who hire youths. The subsidy 
was given to cover training costs that would be incurred by the firm. Furthermore, the 
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participants were provided with a transportation subsidy (Inter-Regional Inequality facility, 
2006: 2). 
 
The Chile Joven was beneficial because it was able to cover a large geographical area in a 
short time. The subsidy programme was able to train 110 000 youths, which was above the 
intended target by 10 per cent (Smith 2006: 19). Furthermore, the Chile Joven increased the 
participation rate by 26 per cent. In contrast, the number of men who received training was 
much lower than the number of women. 
 
One of the challenges encountered by the Chile Joven was the failure of a conducive 
relationship between the state and the public, which led to financial insecurity especially with 
regard to the flow of funds. The labour market requirements were tiresome. 
 
Argentina 
The Argentine economy is similar to that of South Africa as both countries experience high 
rates of unemployment with low-skilled workers being most affected (Centre for International 
and Comparative Labour and Social Security Law, 2007: 14). To combat the high rates of 
unemployment the Argentine government introduced a wage subsidy called Proyecto Joven.  
 
Marshall (1997: 23) stated that the Proyecto Joven was more of a training subsidy than an 
employment subsidy. It targeted youths between the ages of 15 and 24 years. The subsidy was 
designed in such a way that a participating firm received a training subsidy for six months, on 
condition that the firm kept the trainee for an additional six months of work. 
 
Burns et el. (2010: 6) reported that the subsidy trained 112 000 youths through 6 185 courses. 
However, the programme was unsuccessful because there were a substantial number of 
retrenchments that occurred during its implementation. This because the structural imbalances 
in the labour market as well as other market rigidities were not addressed. Therefore, The 
Argentine Proyecto Joven was unsuccessful in raising employment levels.  
 
United Kingdom 
In 1998 the British government introduced a subsidy called the New Deal to try to curb the 
problem of youth unemployment (Smith 2006:15). The subsidy was given to an employer 
who hired youths aged 18-24 years. A subsidy of £60 a week was given for 24 weeks for 
employing a youth. In addition to hiring the youths, the employer had to provide training at 
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least once a week, for which a subsidy of £750 was given.  When the subsidy expired and an 
individual was unemployed, they were required to select one of the following: one year of 
subsidised education or training, six months of employment in the voluntary sector, or 
employment with the government Environmental Task Force. 
 
Smith (2006: 16) explained that the New Deal subsidy was successful as it increased the 
likelihood of youth employment by 11 percentage points. The success of the New Deal was 
attributed to the fact that it was not only an employing subsidy, but it also addressed the 
underlying causes of youth unemployment such as lack of education or job search skills. 
Therefore, the New Deal was more or less a combination of various strategies to reduce youth 
unemployment – hence its success. 
 
Lessons for South Africa 
In developing and transitional economies a wage subsidy may not be effective at stimulating 
employment. Take, for example, the case of Argentina, where the implementation of a 
subsidy was accompanied by an increase in retrenchments. Burns et el. (2010: 8) caution that 
the success of the wage subsidy is dependent on the structure of the market and the elasticity 
of substitution. In developed countries, where the elasticity of substitution is low, the wage 
subsidy was a success – Australia is an example. However, in a transitional economy (e.g. 
South Africa) a wage subsidy may not be effective because of market rigidities – for example 
Argentina. 
 
Furthermore, the youth wage subsidy would be beneficial in South Africa since it aims to 
target a broader margin. Smith (2006: 22) asserted that a subsidy for a larger targeted group 
may decrease stigmatisation as well as uncertainties around eligibility. Furthermore, the youth 
wage subsidy would potentially have highly dynamic effects even if the initial take-up is 
larger. For example, if the subsidy created 100 000 jobs per year and 80 per cent of these 
people remained in employment, then in the 2nd year there would be 180 000 new jobs, 
244 000 in the third year. However, this kind of success would not be possible if the 
underlying causes of youth unemployment such labour market rigidities and skills mismatch 
are not addressed. In the case of the United Kingdom, the subsidy was accompanied by other 
policies such training and job search assistance to ensure that the youth are kept in 
employment.  
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4.4  Conclusion 
 
This chapter first discussed possible policy solutions to the problem of youth unemployment. 
Then it went on to describe the proposed design of the youth wage subsidy in South Africa, 
discussing some of the pros and cons of such a subsidy. It then lastly discussed the experience 
of other countries that have implemented the wage subsidy. The results showed that the wage 
subsidy was successful in Australia and Chile, since it was able to reduce youth 
unemployment. The lesson for South Africa is that a youth wage subsidy cannot be successful 
if the underlying causes of youth unemployment are not addressed. Causes such as poor 
quality of education, lack of mobility, financial constraints and labour market rigidities (as 
discussed in Chapter 3) should be addressed if the youth wage subsidy is to be successful in 
South Africa. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
68 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This study looked at the feasibility of the youth wage subsidy as a possible solution to the 
acute problem of youth unemployment. All available labour force survey data published by 
Stats SA between OHS 1995 to QLFS 2011Q4 to analyse the trends in youth labour force, 
youth employment and youth unemployment were consulted. It also discussed causes of 
youth unemployment. This chapter first reviews the findings of the thesis before providing a 
conclusion. 
 
5.2  Review of findings 
 
Chapter 2 analysed statistics on the youth labour force, both employed and unemployed under 
the narrow definition. It revealed that in the period under study the youth labour force 
increased. However, the increase in youth employment was too slow, thereby resulting in an 
increase in youth unemployment (youths constitute nearly 50 per cent of the unemployed). It 
further showed that youth unemployment rates were highest for the female blacks, those 
residing in the Free State province, without a Matric qualification. The results of a 
multinomial logistic regression revealed that individual characteristics such race, age, 
province of residence and family background have a significant impact on the likelihood of 
youth employment. 
 
Furthermore, Chapter 3 discussed major causes of youth unemployment. The lack of mobility 
and resources hinder youth from searching for jobs, hence they remain unemployed. 
Furthermore youths have high reservation wage as well as high expectations which makes 
them reluctant to start at the entry level, hence they remain unemployed. In addition, youths 
lack soft skills, work experience as well as lack of work readiness. Another major cause of 
youth unemployment discussed was skills mismatch focusing on the quality, quantity and 
field of study, which have a significant impact on youth employment. Moreover, the failure of 
the informal sector to provide jobs for unemployed youths has greatly contributed to the high 
youth unemployment rates. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed possible policy options such the active labour market policies which 
could help curb the escalating problem of youth unemployment. These policies job assistance, 
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public work programmes, training layoff schemes and stipend-paid volunteers. The chapter 
also went on to explain the youth wage subsidy, providing details on how the subsidy would 
work, the pros and cons of the youth wage subsidy, and the international experience of 
countries that implemented a target subsidy. 
 
5.3  Conclusion 
 
The thesis concludes that even though the youth wage subsidy would be effective to stimulate 
labour demand, it fails to address the underlying causes of youth unemployment. The youth 
wage subsidy programme would not be fully effective in solving the youth unemployment 
problem in South Africa. Causes such as rigid labour market legislation, lack of mobility, 
high reservation wages, skills mismatch are not addressed by the youth wage subsidy. 
Therefore, in order for the youth wage subsidy (which would address lack of experience and 
soft skills) to be more effective, it has to be implemented alongside other complementary 
labour market policies. For instance, job search assistance would help target lack of mobility 
and resources as causes of youth unemployment; better education policies would help address 
the problem of skills mismatch; better career guidance could help target the problem of high 
expectations and reservation wages among the youth labour force. Furthermore, the 
government needs to implement policies to target the problem of labour market rigidities and 
discrimination. The government also needs to further review the current strategies on SMEs in 
order to help create jobs for youths by promoting the development of SMEs and transforming 
informal enterprises into more formal enterprises, thereby improving the job security of the 
(youth) workers.  
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Appendix A: Youth labour market trends in South Africa 
 
Table A.1: Characteristics of youth narrow unemployed and discouraged work seekers, QLFS 2011Q4  
 Discouraged work seekers Narrow unemployed 
Race 
Black 94.67% 87.47% 
Coloured 3.83% 8.60% 
Indian 0.80% 0.95% 
White 0.71% 2.98% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
Gender 
Male 48.67% 48.92% 
Female 51.33% 51.08% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
Province 
Western Cape 1.65% 11.01% 
Eastern Cape 16.71% 11.68% 
Northern Cape 1.47% 2.49% 
Free State 3.29% 7.37% 
KwaZulu-Natal 26.15% 17.01% 
North-West 10.77% 5.39% 
Gauteng 10.65% 30.38% 
Mpumalanga 10.15% 8.50% 
Limpopo 19.16% 6.17% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
Area type 
Urban 38.39% 72.04% 
Rural 61.61% 27.96% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
Highest educational attainment 
No schooling 0.63% 0.60% 
Incomplete primary 8.30% 3.67% 
Incomplete secondary 57.47% 48.98% 
Matric 29.77% 39.55% 
Matric + Certificate/Diploma 3.66% 5.68% 
Degree 0.06% 1.20% 
Unspecified 0.11% 0.31% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Own Calculation using QLFS 2011Q4 
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Table A.2: Number of youth labour force by race (1 000s), 1995-2011 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
OHS1995 2 420 555 156 585 
OHS1996 2 247 542 140 576 
OHS1997 2 362 545 148 554 
OHS1998 2 833 574 152 604 
OHS1999 3 142 603 178 651 
LFS2000a 4 158 639 178 658 
LFS2000b 4 371 644 188 614 
LFS2001a 4 470 664 179 626 
LFS2001b 4 267 625 208 631 
LFS2002a 4 420 690 200 636 
LFS2002b 4 395 658 215 575 
LFS2003a 4 458 687 209 567 
LFS2003b 4 199 672 197 555 
LFS2004a 4 184 648 170 538 
LFS2004b 4 118 623 164 517 
LFS2005a 4 264 621 181 474 
LFS2005b 4 540 609 155 468 
LFS2006a 4 455 633 153 488 
LFS2006b 4 645 628 144 456 
LFS2007a 4 652 630 130 454 
LFS2007b 4 622 619 135 496 
QLFS2008Q1 4 852 678 197 507 
QLFS2008Q2 4 895 642 195 476 
QLFS2008Q3 4 851 653 201 474 
QLFS2008Q4 4 848 648 184 443 
QLFS2009Q1 4 807 668 192 467 
QLFS2009Q2 4 681 639 177 457 
QLFS2009Q3 4 448 641 178 429 
QLFS2009Q4 4 459 656 181 442 
QLFS2010Q1 4 471 643 179 460 
QLFS2010Q2 4 464 627 183 456 
QLFS2010Q3 4 501 598 182 438 
QLFS2010Q4 4 387 579 186 411 
OLFS2011Q1 4 504 582 187 410 
QLFS2011Q2 4 629 547 181 434 
QLFS2011Q3 4 527 605 163 445 
QLFS2011Q4 4 499 580 148 450 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.3: Narrow labour force participation rates by age cohort, 1995-2011 
 
18-24 
years 
25-29 
years 
30-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-65 
years 
OHS1995 30.1% 59.9% 68.3% 69.6% 62.7% 31.7% 
OHS1996 28.2% 55.9% 64.2% 66.9% 57.8% 30.6% 
OHS1997 27.6% 56.8% 64.5% 66.2% 58.2% 30.5% 
OHS1998 31.7% 62.9% 70.2% 70.2% 62.6% 31.1% 
OHS1999 35.5% 66.2% 71.6% 73.4% 65.1% 34.0% 
LFS2000a 46.5% 74.9% 82.1% 81.0% 74.9% 48.0% 
LFS2000b 42.9% 74.4% 78.3% 79.2% 72.7% 46.7% 
LFS2001a 43.8% 75.2% 79.1% 80.1% 72.0% 46.6% 
LFS2001b 41.7% 73.4% 77.2% 76.8% 67.2% 39.2% 
LFS2002a 44.9% 73.5% 78.5% 78.5% 70.0% 41.7% 
LFS2002b 42.8% 73.5% 77.7% 77.4% 67.6% 39.3% 
LFS2003a 42.9% 74.6% 77.7% 77.7% 68.1% 38.3% 
LFS2003b 40.3% 71.5% 75.1% 74.5% 66.4% 37.2% 
LFS2004a 39.6% 69.9% 75.6% 73.7% 65.3% 37.6% 
LFS2004b 38.7% 68.5% 74.5% 73.3% 66.3% 37.9% 
LFS2005a 38.8% 71.1% 75.4% 74.2% 66.7% 41.0% 
LFS2005b 42.1% 71.7% 78.2% 75.4% 69.1% 40.3% 
LFS2006a 41.1% 71.8% 77.4% 74.4% 68.2% 41.3% 
LFS2006b 42.6% 72.4% 78.0% 77.4% 70.1% 41.8% 
LFS2007a 41.7% 72.3% 78.0% 75.4% 67.2% 40.5% 
LFS2007b 41.1% 72.8% 76.6% 76.9% 69.3% 40.4% 
QLFS2008Q1 44.0% 75.2% 77.7% 78.4% 69.6% 42.0% 
QLFS2008Q2 43.7% 74.7% 78.7% 77.9% 69.5% 42.3% 
QLFS2008Q3 42.6% 74.8% 77.8% 78.2% 69.2% 41.6% 
QLFS2008Q4 41.7% 74.7% 77.9% 77.6% 69.6% 41.1% 
QLFS2009Q1 42.2% 74.0% 77.9% 77.7% 70.2% 41.7% 
QLFS2009Q2 40.5% 72.3% 76.2% 77.2% 69.0% 40.3% 
QLFS2009Q3 37.4% 70.5% 75.7% 76.6% 67.3% 38.8% 
QLFS2009Q4 38.1% 70.4% 76.0% 76.0% 67.5% 38.7% 
QLFS2010Q1 37.6% 71.1% 74.8% 76.2% 67.2% 38.3% 
QLFS2010Q2 38.1% 69.6% 74.2% 75.0% 67.7% 38.8% 
QLFS2010Q3 36.5% 68.8% 75.2% 75.0% 67.1% 38.0% 
QLFS2010Q4 34.6% 68.1% 74.4% 75.3% 67.4% 38.5% 
QLFS2011Q1 35.8% 69.1% 74.8% 75.8% 67.5% 37.6% 
QLFS2011Q2 36.5% 69.9% 74.4% 75.8% 67.8% 38.7% 
QLFS2011Q3 36.1% 69.0% 75.4% 75.9% 68.8% 38.6% 
QLFS2011Q4 35.2% 68.4% 75.2% 75.8% 68.0% 39.5% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
81 
Table A.4: Youth narrow labour force participation rates by gender, 1995-2011 
 Male Female 
OHS1995 47.5% 35.5% 
OHS1996 43.6% 33.5% 
OHS1997 45.3% 33.0% 
OHS1998 49.5% 37.5% 
OHS1999 51.6% 42.9% 
LFS2000a 60.9% 53.5% 
LFS2000b 60.8% 49.9% 
LFS2001a 61.2% 51.4% 
LFS2001b 59.0% 49.6% 
LFS2002a 61.3% 51.2% 
LFS2002b 60.2% 49.6% 
LFS2003a 60.1% 50.8% 
LFS2003b 57.9% 47.3% 
LFS2004a 56.0% 47.1% 
LFS2004b 56.9% 43.9% 
LFS2005a 56.5% 46.4% 
LFS2005b 59.0% 48.7% 
LFS2006a 57.8% 48.6% 
LFS2006b 59.3% 49.6% 
LFS2007a 58.6% 49.0% 
LFS2007b 58.3% 48.9% 
QLFS2008Q1 62.9% 49.9% 
QLFS2008Q2 61.7% 50.2% 
QLFS2008Q3 60.6% 49.9% 
QLFS2008Q4 59.8% 49.3% 
QLFS2009Q1 60.5% 48.8% 
QLFS2009Q2 58.7% 47.3% 
QLFS2009Q3 55.4% 45.1% 
QLFS2009Q4 56.1% 45.2% 
QLFS2010Q1 55.6% 45.4% 
QLFS2010Q2 55.3% 45.3% 
QLFS2010Q3 53.9% 44.3% 
QLFS2010Q4 52.4% 43.0% 
OLFS2011Q1 53.2% 44.6% 
QLFS2011Q2 53.5% 45.7% 
QLFS2011Q3 53.7% 44.3% 
QLFS2011Q4 53.2% 43.3% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.5: Youth narrow labour force participation rates by race, 1995-2011 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
OHS1995 34.1% 67.5% 65.5% 68.9% 
OHS1996 31.1% 65.1% 58.8% 66.8% 
OHS1997 32.1% 65.7% 61.5% 64.9% 
OHS1998 37.3% 64.9% 59.9% 69.3% 
OHS1999 40.8% 68.8% 70.0% 74.1% 
LFS2000a 52.9% 74.5% 74.2% 73.9% 
LFS2000b 51.9% 70.4% 68.5% 67.9% 
LFS2001a 52.5% 72.0% 68.4% 71.8% 
LFS2001b 50.0% 70.8% 71.4% 73.7% 
LFS2002a 51.9% 77.0% 65.0% 74.1% 
LFS2002b 51.1% 72.8% 72.9% 67.9% 
LFS2003a 51.3% 75.8% 70.6% 70.6% 
LFS2003b 48.2% 72.1% 72.9% 70.2% 
LFS2004a 47.5% 72.1% 62.8% 68.1% 
LFS2004b 46.7% 68.6% 58.7% 66.5% 
LFS2005a 48.0% 70.3% 66.6% 63.9% 
LFS2005b 50.8% 70.0% 65.7% 66.1% 
LFS2006a 50.0% 71.2% 60.8% 67.7% 
LFS2006b 51.8% 70.6% 58.1% 64.3% 
LFS2007a 51.2% 70.2% 52.7% 65.6% 
LFS2007b 50.9% 66.4% 62.1% 69.7% 
QLFS2008Q1 53.1% 73.5% 70.0% 69.0% 
QLFS2008Q2 53.3% 70.2% 70.5% 65.2% 
QLFS2008Q3 52.5% 69.8% 72.2% 63.6% 
QLFS2008Q4 52.2% 70.6% 65.5% 60.8% 
QLFS2009Q1 51.7% 72.2% 67.2% 63.6% 
QLFS2009Q2 50.1% 70.4% 63.0% 63.1% 
QLFS2009Q3 47.2% 70.0% 61.5% 60.0% 
QLFS2009Q4 47.4% 71.1% 61.7% 60.8% 
QLFS2010Q1 47.3% 69.7% 61.2% 63.7% 
QLFS2010Q2 47.2% 67.8% 63.5% 62.0% 
QLFS2010Q3 46.3% 67.1% 60.4% 57.9% 
QLFS2010Q4 45.0% 65.5% 63.2% 54.8% 
OLFS2011Q1 46.2% 66.1% 63.0% 57.1% 
QLFS2011Q2 47.5% 60.0% 62.5% 59.3% 
QLFS2011Q3 46.3% 66.4% 56.6% 60.8% 
QLFS2011Q4 45.7% 64.2% 51.6% 61.8% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.6: Youth narrow labour force participation rates by province, 1995-2011 
 WC EC NC FS KZN NW GAU MPU LIM 
OHS1995 66.0% 29.6% 56.7% 42.3% 40.6% 37.4% 52.7% 33.0% 17.6% 
OHS1996 60.8% 26.7% 53.0% 39.6% 36.5% 30.2% 50.7% 32.1% 18.2% 
OHS1997 63.3% 23.5% 52.0% 37.7% 35.0% 32.9% 52.3% 35.7% 23.4% 
OHS1998 60.3% 31.4% 54.0% 41.6% 41.9% 39.1% 53.8% 44.0% 27.7% 
OHS1999 70.1% 34.8% 58.2% 44.7% 48.0% 39.2% 56.0% 45.3% 30.0% 
LFS2000a 74.6% 50.0% 65.8% 59.0% 59.6% 47.6% 62.6% 52.6% 42.8% 
LFS2000b 71.3% 46.3% 65.4% 54.4% 55.8% 48.0% 65.6% 53.7% 37.0% 
LFS2001a 70.5% 47.3% 64.1% 58.9% 54.5% 49.1% 68.8% 52.8% 36.8% 
LFS2001b 71.6% 44.7% 61.6% 54.4% 53.3% 44.8% 66.4% 50.9% 36.9% 
LFS2002a 74.1% 53.6% 66.2% 59.3% 54.5% 47.7% 63.6% 51.8% 37.9% 
LFS2002b 70.1% 44.9% 62.0% 54.1% 56.7% 49.9% 65.2% 51.9% 34.1% 
LFS2003a 75.0% 45.8% 63.1% 58.2% 55.0% 49.4% 64.6% 50.7% 36.4% 
LFS2003b 73.3% 42.2% 59.3% 54.6% 53.3% 46.9% 62.2% 48.3% 30.9% 
LFS2004a 71.8% 40.4% 55.4% 54.6% 51.4% 46.8% 62.4% 47.9% 29.7% 
LFS2004b 67.4% 42.9% 53.9% 54.6% 47.3% 41.9% 61.4% 49.3% 32.2% 
LFS2005a 69.7% 44.1% 61.0% 56.0% 51.2% 46.9% 59.7% 48.6% 30.4% 
LFS2005b 71.4% 45.7% 56.3% 57.2% 53.3% 48.5% 64.7% 50.1% 30.6% 
LFS2006a 73.0% 49.5% 60.7% 54.4% 50.7% 49.0% 61.4% 52.3% 30.2% 
LFS2006b 68.0% 49.2% 66.9% 50.8% 52.2% 48.8% 66.9% 55.3% 29.3% 
LFS2007a 71.3% 43.2% 64.4% 51.6% 52.1% 53.9% 64.0% 54.1% 31.6% 
LFS2007b 68.0% 44.2% 60.8% 55.1% 52.0% 45.8% 65.8% 53.8% 31.8% 
QLFS2008Q1 72.0% 46.4% 61.8% 59.3% 52.2% 51.3% 69.9% 51.2% 37.5% 
QLFS2008Q2 71.0% 45.5% 57.5% 58.8% 54.0% 51.7% 68.6% 52.7% 35.4% 
QLFS2008Q3 68.2% 45.8% 59.7% 55.0% 52.7% 52.5% 69.2% 51.5% 34.7% 
QLFS2010Q4 67.5% 43.8% 60.3% 54.2% 53.5% 53.7% 67.6% 51.6% 33.6% 
QLFS2009Q1 70.2% 44.6% 60.1% 57.2% 51.6% 53.8% 66.1% 54.3% 33.7% 
QLFS2009Q2 69.1% 45.1% 55.2% 55.2% 45.8% 53.1% 67.4% 52.8% 31.3% 
QLFS2009Q3 70.2% 40.1% 56.8% 52.3% 44.3% 47.1% 63.1% 50.4% 30.9% 
QLFS2009Q4 70.1% 41.6% 59.9% 53.2% 43.7% 46.0% 62.8% 50.1% 33.7% 
QLFS2010Q1 69.4% 42.0% 56.1% 52.3% 44.0% 45.5% 64.8% 50.8% 30.7% 
QLFS2010Q2 68.8% 40.0% 55.1% 52.8% 44.0% 47.8% 63.8% 51.0% 30.7% 
QLFS2010Q3 67.9% 41.0% 55.5% 55.1% 40.7% 44.5% 62.8% 50.4% 30.0% 
QLFS2010Q4 66.9% 38.2% 54.9% 54.8% 41.8% 41.2% 61.3% 49.5% 25.2% 
OLFS2011Q1 66.6% 42.4% 55.2% 55.3% 41.1% 41.5% 63.9% 49.7% 27.5% 
QLFS2011Q2 65.8% 44.1% 53.7% 55.6% 43.8% 38.3% 64.9% 51.5% 26.6% 
QLFS2011Q3 68.8% 41.0% 55.2% 56.4% 40.6% 40.7% 64.0% 50.1% 28.8% 
QLFS2011Q4 67.7% 41.1% 57.7% 52.6% 41.9% 38.0% 62.6% 48.7% 27.6% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
WC: Western Cape 
EC: Eastern Cape 
NC: Northern Cape  
FS: Free State 
KZN: KwaZulu-Natal 
NW: North West 
GAU: Gauteng 
MPU: Mpumalanga 
LIM: Limpopo 
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Table A.7: Youth narrow labour force participation rates by educational attainment, 1995-2011 
 No 
Schooling 
Incomplete 
Primary 
Incomplete 
Secondary 
Matric 
Matric + 
Cert/Dip 
Degree 
OHS 1995 39.7% 49.0% 31.1% 51.6% 67.1% 69.1% 
OHS 1996 28.9% 39.3% 29.9% 48.5% 71.8% 69.6% 
OHS 1997 33.4% 39.4% 28.5% 52.6% 79.0% 76.9% 
OHS 1998 41.7% 45.5% 32.7% 57.1% 78.9% 79.0% 
OHS 1999 41.7% 48.1% 36.4% 59.5% 79.6% 80.3% 
LFS 2000a 57.1% 59.6% 48.0% 67.1% 83.6% 85.5% 
LFS 2000b 50.3% 59.4% 45.7% 65.6% 82.7% 83.5% 
LFS 2001a 50.2% 57.7% 47.1% 66.1% 85.7% 82.6% 
LFS 2001b 48.3% 51.4% 44.8% 67.5% 83.0% 82.8% 
LFS 2002a 49.9% 57.4% 46.9% 66.6% 85.4% 85.6% 
LFS 2002b 45.9% 54.0% 45.2% 67.5% 82.2% 89.0% 
LFS 2003a 41.2% 58.8% 46.0% 65.7% 86.6% 88.2% 
LFS 2003b 39.2% 49.9% 42.0% 65.9% 87.8% 88.1% 
LFS 2004a 32.8% 47.8% 42.1% 63.0% 86.2% 84.2% 
LFS 2004b 47.0% 50.6% 40.7% 62.0% 82.9% 85.6% 
LFS 2005a 40.2% 49.0% 43.3% 61.1% 81.7% 81.7% 
LFS 2005b 42.1% 49.7% 45.5% 64.9% 82.0% 78.5% 
LFS 2006a 47.6% 53.5% 45.3% 61.6% 78.8% 78.7% 
LFS 2006b 48.5% 55.6% 45.9% 64.8% 80.5% 75.8% 
LFS 2007a 45.9% 54.6% 46.1% 62.0% 83.0% 81.1% 
LFS 2007b 45.2% 54.3% 44.3% 63.7% 84.0% 87.2% 
QLFS 2008Q1 41.0% 52.7% 47.2% 66.1% 85.2% 85.7% 
QLFS 2008Q2 40.5% 50.4% 46.7% 66.2% 87.8% 84.6% 
QLFS 2008Q3 40.5% 51.3% 45.3% 67.4% 86.0% 84.6% 
QLFS 2010Q4 42.6% 51.7% 44.9% 65.9% 87.3% 81.8% 
QLFS 2009Q1 38.0% 49.1% 46.1% 62.7% 88.1% 82.1% 
QLFS 2009Q2 35.5% 47.1% 44.1% 62.1% 85.2% 83.1% 
QLFS 2009Q3 29.4% 44.0% 41.4% 59.1% 86.4% 77.8% 
QLFS 2009Q4 31.8% 45.5% 41.1% 61.4% 81.0% 80.1% 
QLFS 2010Q1 31.7% 44.9% 42.8% 57.2% 80.9% 78.8% 
QLFS 2010Q2 31.5% 42.5% 41.8% 58.9% 80.9% 82.1% 
QLFS 2010Q3 32.3% 45.2% 40.3% 58.3% 77.2% 77.4% 
QLFS 2010Q4 29.2% 40.6% 38.5% 57.8% 77.7% 82.1% 
OLFS 2011Q1 30.4% 41.6% 41.7% 55.3% 76.9% 81.1% 
QLFS 2011Q2 28.8% 45.8% 41.0% 57.7% 79.5% 79.8% 
QLFS 2011Q3 34.4% 47.6% 40.5% 57.1% 78.5% 79.7% 
QLFS 2011Q4 34.4% 44.7% 39.1% 57.1% 79.0% 84.7% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.8: Share of the youth employed in each broad occupation category, 1995-2011 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] [J] [K] 
OHS 1995 2.8% 2.8% 10.5% 16.0% 13.6% 0.8% 10.7% 9.7% 27.2% 5.7% 0.2% 
OHS 1996 3.6% 3.4% 13.4% 13.2% 15.6% 2.5% 12.6% 6.1% 17.7% 6.1% 5.9% 
OHS 1997 4.9% 7.6% 8.3% 12.1% 13.6% 3.0% 13.6% 8.3% 18.7% 6.3% 3.5% 
OHS 1998 4.4% 4.8% 8.7% 14.2% 15.1% 2.5% 14.3% 8.4% 18.9% 5.7% 3.0% 
OHS 1999 4.0% 4.8% 9.6% 14.2% 15.8% 4.3% 11.9% 8.0% 20.1% 5.4% 1.9% 
LFS 2000a 3.1% 3.3% 7.9% 11.4% 14.4% 15.0% 11.6% 7.0% 19.5% 6.4% 0.5% 
LFS 2000b 2.5% 4.0% 8.3% 10.4% 15.4% 10.1% 12.7% 7.5% 22.7% 5.8% 0.6% 
LFS 2001a 3.0% 3.2% 8.8% 11.6% 17.0% 7.8% 11.8% 7.4% 23.6% 5.2% 0.6% 
LFS 2001b 3.5% 3.6% 8.8% 13.2% 16.9% 4.3% 12.8% 7.4% 23.3% 5.9% 0.4% 
LFS 2002a 3.3% 3.4% 8.9% 12.3% 15.3% 9.5% 11.9% 7.6% 21.7% 5.8% 0.3% 
LFS 2002b 4.4% 3.6% 8.4% 13.5% 14.9% 5.9% 12.5% 8.1% 22.7% 5.6% 0.3% 
LFS 2003a 4.0% 4.5% 7.8% 12.5% 14.4% 3.8% 12.1% 8.7% 26.5% 5.4% 0.3% 
LFS 2003b 4.1% 3.9% 8.3% 13.4% 16.0% 2.8% 11.9% 7.8% 26.1% 5.6% 0.1% 
LFS 2004a 3.9% 3.7% 8.1% 14.0% 15.3% 2.3% 12.2% 8.0% 26.9% 5.7% 0.1% 
LFS 2004b 4.7% 2.9% 7.6% 13.8% 16.1% 2.5% 12.6% 7.3% 26.5% 5.8% 0.3% 
LFS 2005a 3.8% 3.3% 7.1% 12.6% 15.8% 3.2% 15.0% 8.3% 25.5% 5.1% 0.3% 
LFS 2005b 3.9% 3.5% 7.4% 11.9% 17.7% 2.0% 14.6% 7.7% 25.9% 5.1% 0.2% 
LFS 2006a 3.4% 3.2% 7.4% 12.2% 16.8% 5.2% 15.3% 6.8% 24.7% 4.8% 0.2% 
LFS 2006b 3.6% 3.1% 7.0% 12.6% 17.4% 2.7% 16.0% 7.1% 25.2% 5.2% 0.1% 
LFS 2007a 4.3% 3.5% 7.0% 14.1% 15.8% 3.1% 14.8% 7.9% 24.1% 5.1% 0.2% 
LFS 2007b 4.4% 5.0% 10.0% 11.7% 16.1% 2.1% 14.5% 7.8% 22.3% 5.7% 0.4% 
QLFS 2008Q1 3.7% 4.6% 7.8% 14.7% 17.9% 0.4% 15.4% 7.4% 24.2% 4.0% 0.0% 
QLFS 2008Q2 3.9% 5.1% 9.0% 14.0% 16.5% 0.4% 15.2% 7.4% 25.0% 3.5% 0.0% 
QLFS 2008Q3 3.7% 4.7% 9.3% 13.4% 17.2% 0.6% 14.5% 8.3% 24.4% 4.1% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q4 3.8% 4.7% 8.7% 13.1% 15.9% 0.7% 14.7% 8.1% 26.0% 4.4% 0.0% 
QLFS 2009Q1 4.1% 5.4% 8.6% 13.1% 17.1% 0.7% 14.2% 8.0% 24.6% 4.2% 0.0% 
QLFS 2009Q2 3.3% 4.1% 9.1% 14.0% 17.6% 0.4% 15.1% 7.9% 24.4% 4.1% 0.0% 
QLFS 2009Q3 3.5% 5.3% 7.9% 14.1% 18.5% 0.3% 14.0% 8.1% 24.1% 4.0% 0.0% 
QLFS 2009Q4 3.2% 4.4% 9.3% 14.3% 18.5% 0.5% 13.3% 7.5% 25.1% 3.9% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q1 3.5% 4.7% 9.5% 14.0% 17.5% 0.4% 14.0% 7.2% 24.7% 4.5% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q2 3.5% 5.1% 8.6% 14.3% 18.6% 0.5% 13.2% 6.7% 25.3% 4.2% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q3 3.3% 5.3% 8.0% 14.3% 19.5% 0.3% 13.7% 7.5% 23.8% 4.3% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q4 4.0% 5.4% 8.6% 14.5% 18.4% 0.4% 12.6% 7.5% 24.5% 4.0% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q1 4.2% 4.8% 8.5% 14.4% 19.2% 0.3% 12.8% 7.0% 24.6% 4.2% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q2 4.0% 5.3% 9.3% 13.3% 19.3% 0.3% 12.2% 7.6% 24.9% 3.8% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q3 4.1% 4.6% 9.5% 14.2% 18.4% 0.2% 12.7% 7.2% 25.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q4 3.7% 4.5% 9.3% 15.2% 18.4% 0.2% 12.4% 7.6% 25.0% 3.8% 0.0% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
Highly-skilled occupations:  [A]: Legislators, senior officials and managers 
                                         [B]: Professionals 
                                         [C]: Technicians and associate professional 
Semi-skilled occupations:   [D]: Clerks 
                                                  [E]: Service workers and shop and market sales 
                                                  [F]: Skilled agricultural and fishery worker 
                                                  [G]: Craft and related workers 
                                                  [H]: Plant and machinery operators and assemblers 
Unskilled occupations:              [I]: Elementary occupations 
                                                  [J]: Domestic Worker 
Others:                                       [K]: Others/Unspecified 
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Table A.9: Share of the youth employed in each broad industry category, 1995-2011 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I] [J] [K] 
OHS 1995 15.6% 3.6% 15.1% 0.7% 4.2% 19.8% 4.9% 7.2% 20.2% 6.8% 1.9% 
OHS 1996 9.3% 2.0% 14.6% 1.4% 4.5% 18.2% 4.3% 11.3% 20.5% 7.1% 6.9% 
OHS 1997 9.5% 3.1% 16.2% 1.1% 5.5% 21.0% 5.3% 9.9% 18.5% 6.0% 4.0% 
OHS 1998 11.8% 3.4% 14.3% 0.7% 6.8% 22.2% 5.5% 11.7% 15.6% 5.9% 2.0% 
OHS 1999 12.3% 2.9% 14.5% 0.6% 5.4% 24.0% 4.8% 12.6% 14.3% 7.0% 1.6% 
LFS 2000a 22.1% 2.4% 10.3% 0.7% 5.3% 24.1% 4.5% 8.9% 12.8% 8.0% 1.1% 
LFS 2000b 17.7% 3.1% 12.3% 0.8% 5.5% 24.4% 4.1% 10.7% 12.9% 7.7% 0.8% 
LFS 2001a 13.5% 2.9% 12.4% 0.8% 5.5% 30.6% 4.6% 10.4% 11.5% 7.1% 0.9% 
LFS 2001b 11.6% 3.2% 13.9% 0.8% 5.6% 26.9% 4.5% 12.7% 12.9% 7.3% 0.6% 
LFS 2002a 17.3% 2.4% 13.2% 0.5% 4.9% 24.5% 4.4% 12.6% 11.9% 7.7% 0.5% 
LFS 2002b 13.9% 3.2% 14.6% 0.6% 5.7% 23.0% 5.1% 13.0% 12.6% 7.6% 0.8% 
LFS 2003a 13.5% 3.1% 13.8% 0.6% 5.9% 25.7% 5.1% 11.9% 12.6% 7.7% 0.3% 
LFS 2003b 12.6% 2.9% 13.6% 0.6% 6.1% 26.1% 4.6% 12.2% 13.5% 7.4% 0.2% 
LFS 2004a 13.1% 3.0% 14.3% 0.7% 6.2% 25.0% 4.6% 12.6% 12.9% 7.4% 0.2% 
LFS 2004b 10.2% 2.3% 14.5% 0.5% 8.4% 26.9% 4.8% 12.3% 12.0% 7.8% 0.3% 
LFS 2005a 10.5% 2.4% 13.7% 0.9% 8.7% 27.9% 4.9% 11.4% 11.7% 7.4% 0.4% 
LFS 2005b 8.0% 2.2% 12.2% 0.5% 9.5% 30.8% 5.3% 12.6% 11.8% 6.7% 0.2% 
LFS 2006a 11.6% 2.5% 13.0% 0.9% 8.3% 30.9% 3.9% 10.9% 10.8% 6.9% 0.3% 
LFS 2006b 8.8% 2.1% 14.0% 0.6% 9.0% 29.1% 4.8% 11.9% 12.6% 7.0% 0.1% 
LFS 2007a 9.1% 2.8% 14.0% 0.9% 9.7% 28.2% 4.3% 12.2% 12.0% 6.5% 0.3% 
LFS 2007b 8.0% 3.1% 13.2% 0.9% 9.7% 27.3% 4.1% 12.8% 13.5% 7.0% 0.4% 
QLFS 2008Q1 6.2% 2.5% 13.7% 0.6% 9.8% 28.5% 5.3% 14.5% 13.1% 5.7% 0.0% 
QLFS 2008Q2 6.6% 2.3% 14.4% 0.6% 9.3% 27.3% 5.5% 15.3% 14.0% 4.7% 0.0% 
QLFS 2008Q3 6.3% 2.0% 14.3% 0.7% 9.6% 29.1% 5.5% 13.5% 12.9% 6.1% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q4 5.9% 2.1% 14.2% 0.7% 10.5% 28.7% 5.4% 13.3% 12.9% 6.4% 0.1% 
QLFS 2009Q1 5.6% 2.2% 13.4% 0.6% 9.8% 28.1% 5.3% 15.8% 13.2% 6.1% 0.0% 
QLFS 2009Q2 5.7% 2.0% 13.7% 0.6% 10.6% 27.1% 5.3% 15.4% 13.8% 5.9% 0.0% 
QLFS 2009Q3 5.3% 2.3% 13.0% 0.4% 10.1% 27.0% 5.5% 16.4% 14.3% 5.7% 0.0% 
QLFS 2009Q4 5.0% 1.8% 13.5% 0.6% 9.6% 27.6% 5.6% 16.6% 14.4% 5.4% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q1 5.4% 1.6% 12.7% 0.5% 10.0% 28.2% 5.6% 15.1% 14.2% 6.7% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q2 5.1% 1.9% 12.9% 0.6% 9.1% 27.8% 5.5% 16.1% 14.8% 6.3% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q3 5.4% 2.2% 12.6% 0.7% 9.5% 29.0% 5.6% 14.2% 14.6% 6.0% 0.0% 
QLFS 2010Q4 5.7% 1.9% 12.2% 0.7% 9.8% 28.0% 5.7% 14.0% 16.1% 5.9% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q1 5.2% 1.9% 13.0% 0.7% 9.7% 27.7% 5.6% 14.7% 15.8% 5.8% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q2 5.1% 1.6% 12.8% 0.7% 9.0% 27.5% 5.9% 15.3% 16.4% 5.6% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q3 5.1% 1.9% 12.4% 0.5% 9.7% 29.0% 5.8% 14.2% 15.6% 5.6% 0.0% 
QLFS 2011Q4 4.5% 1.7% 14.1% 0.6% 8.8% 28.8% 5.7% 14.5% 15.7% 5.4% 0.0% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
Primary sector:           [A]: Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 
                                       [B]: Mining and quarrying 
Secondary sector:                 [C]: Manufacturing 
                                   [D]: Electricity, gas and water supply 
                                            [E]: Construction 
Tertiary sector                     [F]: Wholesale and retail  
                                               [G]: Transport. Storage and communication 
                                               [H]: Financial, insurance and business services 
     [I]: Community, social and personal services 
Other:                                   [J]: Private households 
[K]: Others/Unspecified 
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Table A.10: Number of the youth employed in each sector (1 000s), 1997-2011 
 Domestic 
Workers 
Informal 
sector 
Formal 
sector 
Subsistence 
agriculture 
Commercial 
agriculture 
Don’t 
know Unspecified 
OHS 1997 151 262 1 746 054 161 00 24 
OHS 1998 146 293 1 768 055 243 00 43 
OHS 1999 157 425 1 931 077 275 00 37 
LFS 2000a 210 511 1 802 478 242 30 14 
LFS 2000b 201 587 1 992 330 259 37 68 
LFS 2001a 177 808 1 888 203 246 73 13 
LFS 2001b 181 533 1 959 107 243 46 11 
LFS 2002a 184 503 1 921 248 301 22 05 
LFS 2002b 172 485 1 961 137 284 20 06 
LFS 2003a 163 481 1 948 117 288 17 05 
LFS 2003b 174 532 1 999 104 281 13 03 
LFS 2004a 171 457 1 983 086 309 06 03 
LFS 2004b 180 538 2 072 115 197 21 05 
LFS 2005a 161 587 2 024 129 198 12 15 
LFS 2005b 166 675 2 122 089 170 07 09 
LFS 2006a 158 587 2 159 189 193 06 06 
LFS 2006b 180 662 2 309 117 186 15 06 
LFS 2007a 174 560 2 317 126 180 22 19 
LFS 2007b 210 570 2 563 085 207 14 14 
QLFS 2008Q1 223 689 2 765 041 200 00 00 
QLFS 2008Q2 181 696 2 758 027 229 00 00 
QLFS 2008Q3 235 614 2 741 023 217 00 00 
QLFS 2010Q4 251 649 2 764 029 200 00 00 
QLFS 2009Q1 224 596 2 660 029 178 00 00 
QLFS 2009Q2 213 585 2 615 024 181 00 00 
QLFS 2009Q3 196 579 2 499 016 168 00 00 
QLFS 2009Q4 186 605 2 481 018 153 00 00 
QLFS 2010Q1 228 556 2 435 017 166 00 00 
QLFS 2010Q2 209 595 2 364 017 152 00 00 
QLFS 2010Q3 200 595 2 360 018 163 00 00 
QLFS 2010Q4 197 633 2 320 027 162 00 00 
QLFS 2011Q1 148 619 2 340 023 191 00 00 
QLFS 2011Q2 147 625 2 347 021 188 00 00 
QLFS 2011Q3 155 602 2 406 018 190 00 00 
QLFS 2011Q4 187 623 2 473 014 141 00 00 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.11: Narrow unemployment rates by age cohort, 1995-2011 
 
18-24 
years 
25-29 
years 
30-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-65 
years 
OHS1995 35.9% 23.4% 16.7% 11.4% 8.8% 6.1% 
OHS1996 35.7% 26.0% 19.6% 14.7% 11.8% 8.7% 
OHS1997 39.6% 28.9% 21.6% 15.2% 11.5% 7.1% 
OHS1998 44.8% 33.8% 25.2% 17.3% 13.9% 9.9% 
OHS1999 42.4% 31.6% 22.2% 16.9% 11.2% 7.1% 
LFS2000a 46.2% 36.9% 27.8% 18.5% 13.4% 7.2% 
LFS2000b 48.1% 33.6% 25.3% 17.7% 12.3% 6.8% 
LFS2001a 50.5% 35.9% 25.4% 17.6% 12.7% 7.3% 
LFS2001b 53.8% 39.8% 27.7% 19.8% 13.9% 10.6% 
LFS2002a 55.0% 38.6% 28.2% 20.1% 15.3% 9.1% 
LFS2002b 56.4% 39.7% 27.6% 21.0% 16.1% 10.0% 
LFS2003a 59.4% 39.8% 28.8% 20.8% 15.8% 10.5% 
LFS2003b 55.3% 35.6% 25.7% 18.7% 13.5% 8.9% 
LFS2004a 55.9% 36.5% 26.0% 18.1% 13.7% 7.8% 
LFS2004b 51.8% 34.1% 25.2% 18.2% 11.9% 7.2% 
LFS2005a 52.7% 35.9% 25.9% 17.1% 11.9% 8.1% 
LFS2005b 51.5% 37.1% 23.4% 18.2% 13.0% 8.3% 
LFS2006a 51.5% 34.6% 24.2% 17.2% 11.8% 5.9% 
LFS2006b 50.2% 32.7% 24.3% 18.2% 12.4% 6.9% 
LFS2007a 51.2% 34.1% 23.5% 16.8% 12.3% 6.6% 
LFS2007b 46.8% 29.9% 20.8% 14.5% 11.1% 6.5% 
QLFS2008Q1 45.9% 29.3% 23.4% 16.3% 10.6% 7.7% 
QLFS2008Q2 44.6% 30.7% 22.2% 15.8% 10.0% 7.7% 
QLFS2008Q3 46.6% 30.4% 21.7% 16.6% 9.3% 6.5% 
QLFS2008Q4 44.6% 29.3% 20.5% 14.6% 9.5% 5.2% 
QLFS2009Q1 47.7% 32.9% 21.9% 15.3% 9.7% 5.9% 
QLFS2009Q2 48.1% 31.5% 22.7% 15.7% 10.9% 5.3% 
QLFS2009Q3 48.2% 31.8% 25.5% 17.3% 11.8% 6.7% 
QLFS2009Q4 48.1% 33.1% 23.7% 17.1% 10.8% 6.6% 
QLFS2010Q1 49.9% 33.3% 24.9% 17.9% 11.7% 7.3% 
QLFS2010Q2 51.2% 33.6% 23.9% 17.3% 12.1% 8.0% 
QLFS2010Q3 51.0% 33.8% 24.2% 17.8% 12.4% 7.1% 
QLFS2010Q4 49.4% 32.5% 24.2% 16.6% 11.3% 6.2% 
QLFS2011Q1 49.4% 35.2% 24.8% 16.9% 12.4% 5.9% 
QLFS2011Q2 49.8% 36.7% 24.9% 18.5% 12.6% 5.7% 
QLFS2011Q3 50.1% 34.1% 24.9% 18.2% 11.6% 5.9% 
QLFS2011Q4 49.2% 31.6% 23.8% 17.2% 12.0% 6.0% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.12: Narrow youth unemployment rates by gender, 1995-2011 
 Male Female 
OHS 1995 24.0% 35.5% 
OHS 1996 25.4% 36.5% 
OHS 1997 29.1% 39.2% 
OHS 1998 34.1% 44.7% 
OHS 1999 32.0% 41.9% 
LFS 2000a 39.5% 44.1% 
LFS 2000b 35.7% 46.0% 
LFS 2001a 39.6% 46.5% 
LFS 2001b 41.3% 52.1% 
LFS 2002a 41.6% 52.2% 
LFS 2002b 41.2% 55.3% 
LFS 2003a 43.4% 55.6% 
LFS 2003b 40.4% 49.9% 
LFS 2004a 40.1% 51.8% 
LFS 2004b 37.0% 49.1% 
LFS 2005a 37.6% 50.9% 
LFS 2005b 37.8% 51.1% 
LFS 2006a 36.7% 49.1% 
LFS 2006b 34.9% 47.9% 
LFS 2007a 35.8% 49.7% 
LFS 2007b 33.4% 42.9% 
QLFS 2008Q1 33.0% 42.3% 
QLFS 2008Q2 33.1% 42.4% 
QLFS 2008Q3 33.4% 43.4% 
QLFS 2008Q4 30.9% 43.1% 
QLFS 2009Q1 35.5% 45.2% 
QLFS 2009Q2 35.7% 43.5% 
QLFS 2009Q3 35.6% 43.8% 
QLFS 2009Q4 37.2% 43.5% 
QLFS 2010Q1 37.9% 44.5% 
QLFS 2010Q2 38.3% 45.9% 
QLFS 2010Q3 37.9% 46.3% 
QLFS 2010Q4 36.2% 44.5% 
QLFS 2011Q1 37.6% 46.2% 
QLFS 2011Q2 38.0% 47.7% 
QLFS 2011Q3 36.2% 47.3% 
QLFS 2011Q4 35.3% 44.4% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.13: Narrow youth unemployment rates by race, 1995-2011 
 Black Coloured Indian White 
OHS 1995 36.9% 23.0% 15.9% 06.3% 
OHS 1996 40.7% 17.9% 14.9% 06.4% 
OHS 1997 43.8% 21.3% 16.8% 06.5% 
OHS 1998 49.6% 22.5% 24.1% 07.6% 
OHS 1999 46.3% 22.0% 25.7% 06.7% 
LFS 2000a 49.0% 29.3% 27.2% 11.0% 
LFS 2000b 47.5% 26.9% 21.8% 10.2% 
LFS 2001a 49.7% 29.5% 26.3% 12.3% 
LFS 2001b 55.1% 29.8% 29.6% 08.6% 
LFS 2002a 54.4% 35.0% 26.6% 10.9% 
LFS 2002b 55.7% 32.8% 27.9% 10.6% 
LFS 2003a 57.1% 32.0% 35.4% 11.9% 
LFS 2003b 52.5% 30.3% 27.8% 09.8% 
LFS 2004a 53.3% 30.1% 27.3% 10.5% 
LFS 2004b 48.8% 31.9% 23.6% 10.9% 
LFS 2005a 49.7% 33.0% 30.5% 09.2% 
LFS 2005b 49.2% 35.8% 28.5% 09.6% 
LFS 2006a 48.6% 30.5% 19.6% 10.1% 
LFS 2006b 46.2% 29.5% 16.6% 11.0% 
LFS 2007a 47.5% 31.2% 19.0% 09.3% 
LFS 2007b 42.2% 32.8% 11.9% 10.0% 
QLFS 2008Q1 41.5% 31.7% 17.9% 10.5% 
QLFS 2008Q2 41.5% 31.7% 22.5% 07.9% 
QLFS 2008Q3 42.4% 31.1% 19.7% 10.1% 
QLFS 2008Q4 40.7% 28.9% 21.6% 07.3% 
QLFS 2009Q1 44.1% 32.5% 23.6% 13.7% 
QLFS 2009Q2 43.7% 32.1% 20.4% 10.5% 
QLFS 2009Q3 43.7% 35.0% 20.0% 08.1% 
QLFS 2009Q4 44.6% 35.0% 17.5% 10.8% 
QLFS 2010Q1 45.8% 33.5% 14.1% 13.6% 
QLFS 2010Q2 46.2% 35.8% 19.4% 15.9% 
QLFS 2010Q3 46.2% 38.5% 12.9% 11.8% 
QLFS 2010Q4 44.3% 35.5% 12.2% 13.0% 
QLFS 2011Q1 45.3% 38.0% 23.5% 13.3% 
QLFS 2011Q2 47.0% 37.2% 21.2% 10.4% 
QLFS 2011Q3 45.7% 37.2% 16.1% 11.0% 
QLFS 2011Q4 43.5% 33.2% 14.4% 14.8% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.14: Narrow youth unemployment rates by province, 1995-2011  
 WC EC NC FS KZN NW GAU MPU LIM 
OHS 1995 20.8% 37.1% 32.4% 19.0% 34.8% 32.4% 26.5% 31.0% 35.8% 
OHS 1996 17.5% 42.4% 20.8% 31.8% 39.2% 27.9% 27.1% 26.0% 46.0% 
OHS 1997 17.3% 42.6% 27.7% 30.8% 37.4% 36.9% 34.1% 39.1% 44.9% 
OHS 1998 20.2% 51.9% 28.7% 34.8% 43.1% 42.7% 35.8% 41.2% 56.8% 
OHS 1999 20.3% 46.0% 27.7% 38.2% 40.5% 39.7% 31.9% 43.0% 55.5% 
LFS 2000a 28.8% 37.5% 33.2% 35.5% 45.6% 48.8% 46.2% 45.3% 43.5% 
LFS 2000b 26.7% 42.2% 29.9% 40.1% 43.4% 47.0% 39.8% 43.0% 47.9% 
LFS 2001a 29.2% 46.4% 39.4% 47.2% 42.4% 47.0% 43.5% 44.2% 50.1% 
LFS 2001b 26.7% 49.4% 40.3% 46.9% 51.6% 50.0% 45.9% 47.4% 57.6% 
LFS 2002a 28.9% 40.8% 42.5% 50.6% 55.4% 50.8% 45.4% 48.0% 57.3% 
LFS 2002b 31.4% 52.3% 38.3% 50.9% 51.5% 50.3% 46.9% 49.0% 55.3% 
LFS 2003a 31.3% 45.7% 45.1% 51.3% 55.8% 53.3% 48.2% 50.5% 63.0% 
LFS 2003b 30.8% 50.9% 40.6% 50.2% 49.0% 47.1% 43.4% 41.2% 52.0% 
LFS 2004a 29.0% 50.7% 40.8% 46.7% 53.3% 48.5% 43.5% 45.8% 51.9% 
LFS 2004b 30.7% 47.3% 39.3% 47.5% 46.3% 44.8% 41.0% 39.3% 48.1% 
LFS 2005a 31.7% 45.3% 47.2% 48.3% 49.9% 47.8% 38.2% 44.0% 54.1% 
LFS 2005b 31.9% 48.6% 38.7% 51.8% 51.4% 48.1% 37.9% 42.7% 51.0% 
LFS 2006a 26.6% 37.6% 37.5% 47.6% 48.2% 53.6% 40.1% 44.5% 58.9% 
LFS 2006b 27.5% 48.1% 42.2% 47.6% 41.4% 48.4% 37.4% 45.8% 48.4% 
LFS 2007a 32.6% 41.5% 43.3% 44.5% 48.0% 52.1% 35.9% 43.6% 53.1% 
LFS 2007b 28.5% 39.4% 39.2% 43.1% 47.5% 44.1% 29.5% 35.8% 46.8% 
QLFS 2008Q1 28.5% 43.0% 38.7% 40.9% 34.2% 35.8% 37.3% 37.0% 50.4% 
QLFS 2008Q2 31.5% 37.2% 37.2% 42.4% 34.5% 37.7% 37.1% 39.5% 51.1% 
QLFS 2008Q3 32.7% 42.6% 35.5% 36.4% 34.7% 43.4% 37.7% 36.0% 51.0% 
QLFS 2010Q4 29.1% 40.2% 34.8% 38.9% 33.5% 42.7% 35.9% 35.5% 49.6% 
QLFS 2009Q1 30.7% 44.9% 46.1% 42.4% 38.2% 46.8% 38.4% 41.9% 47.6% 
QLFS 2009Q2 34.2% 42.5% 42.0% 43.2% 33.3% 46.8% 39.1% 45.1% 42.4% 
QLFS 2009Q3 36.2% 41.3% 46.3% 45.5% 31.2% 44.0% 40.7% 42.2% 43.6% 
QLFS 2009Q4 35.0% 45.2% 40.1% 44.1% 30.6% 45.6% 43.2% 42.3% 44.0% 
QLFS 2010Q1 31.8% 46.1% 45.7% 45.9% 31.9% 45.0% 44.1% 49.1% 44.4% 
QLFS 2010Q2 34.6% 45.0% 50.4% 47.6% 35.0% 49.6% 45.0% 46.6% 36.7% 
QLFS 2010Q3 38.8% 43.9% 44.2% 47.3% 32.6% 46.4% 45.0% 44.8% 40.7% 
QLFS 2010Q4 36.5% 41.0% 40.1% 42.2% 32.9% 43.0% 45.7% 46.8% 27.9% 
QLFS 2011Q1 35.8% 42.0% 49.0% 44.3% 34.9% 44.4% 46.5% 49.4% 33.4% 
QLFS 2011Q2 35.8% 44.0% 47.0% 42.7% 34.4% 52.3% 47.3% 49.1% 40.9% 
QLFS 2011Q3 35.1% 42.3% 49.0% 38.8% 33.4% 50.4% 47.1% 47.6% 35.4% 
QLFS 2011Q4 32.3% 40.3% 41.1% 45.8% 34.1% 45.0% 43.2% 43.9% 36.5% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
WC: Western Cape 
EC: Eastern Cape 
NC: Northern Cape  
FS: Free State 
KZN: KwaZulu-Natal 
NW: North West 
GAU: Gauteng 
MPU: Mpumalanga 
LIM: Limpopo 
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Table A.15: Narrow youth unemployment rates by educational attainment, 1995-2011 
 
No 
Schooling 
Incomplete 
Primary 
Incomplete 
Secondary 
Matric 
Matric + 
Cert/Dip 
Degree 
OHS 1995 20.5% 23.0% 26.3% 22.0% 09.6% 05.9% 
OHS 1996 23.8% 28.1% 26.8% 21.5% 07.5% 08.4% 
OHS 1997 25.7% 27.0% 27.9% 24.7% 13.0% 09.8% 
OHS 1998 22.5% 29.8% 31.2% 27.0% 16.9% 10.5% 
OHS 1999 22.5% 25.9% 29.9% 26.9% 19.1% 09.3% 
LFS 2000a 21.5% 27.0% 31.0% 30.7% 23.7% 16.1% 
LFS 2000b 26.3% 28.8% 30.9% 29.2% 21.2% 10.8% 
LFS 2001a 25.0% 29.0% 31.3% 31.4% 21.8% 16.1% 
LFS 2001b 29.3% 31.4% 34.5% 30.8% 24.1% 12.2% 
LFS 2002a 19.3% 29.7% 34.4% 31.8% 25.5% 11.5% 
LFS 2002b 25.5% 32.3% 35.2% 31.8% 23.3% 10.8% 
LFS 2003a 25.9% 31.5% 35.4% 33.1% 25.4% 10.7% 
LFS 2003b 26.0% 30.9% 34.2% 30.0% 22.3% 07.9% 
LFS 2004a 27.8% 28.7% 33.6% 32.3% 18.9% 10.4% 
LFS 2004b 19.1% 31.7% 32.6% 29.4% 17.5% 06.9% 
LFS 2005a 26.8% 29.7% 33.3% 29.7% 21.0% 07.2% 
LFS 2005b 22.3% 31.3% 33.2% 30.0% 18.8% 10.2% 
LFS 2006a 29.1% 29.2% 32.1% 29.5% 21.8% 11.1% 
LFS 2006b 25.5% 29.8% 31.5% 28.3% 19.1% 09.0% 
LFS 2007a 27.4% 29.7% 32.3% 29.1% 17.3% 09.7% 
LFS 2007b 21.1% 30.2% 30.3% 26.6% 18.4% 06.3% 
QLFS 2008Q1 23.9% 28.6% 29.7% 26.3% 17.7% 14.4% 
QLFS 2008Q2 19.4% 28.5% 29.9% 26.7% 17.8% 06.6% 
QLFS 2008Q3 22.1% 27.4% 30.0% 27.3% 19.5% 07.9% 
QLFS 2010Q4 28.2% 26.5% 29.3% 26.6% 16.0% 09.1% 
QLFS 2009Q1 24.9% 25.8% 31.4% 28.6% 18.0% 10.4% 
QLFS 2009Q2 28.1% 28.6% 30.6% 28.2% 17.6% 11.1% 
QLFS 2009Q3 17.0% 29.3% 31.4% 27.4% 19.5% 09.2% 
QLFS 2009Q4 17.0% 32.8% 31.4% 27.7% 19.3% 09.4% 
QLFS 2010Q1 20.4% 30.0% 31.9% 28.2% 20.6% 13.0% 
QLFS 2010Q2 16.6% 33.0% 31.3% 29.7% 22.4% 10.9% 
QLFS 2010Q3 21.0% 32.6% 32.0% 28.9% 20.7% 10.6% 
QLFS 2010Q4 32.0% 30.5% 30.5% 28.7% 20.1% 11.0% 
QLFS 2011Q1 28.0% 28.4% 31.5% 29.7% 20.2% 14.5% 
QLFS 2011Q2 27.4% 29.0% 32.1% 30.4% 20.2% 14.2% 
QLFS 2011Q3 30.7% 25.7% 31.2% 29.8% 21.4% 10.0% 
QLFS 2011Q4 28.8% 26.6% 30.6% 28.3% 20.9% 13.4% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS, LFS and QLFS data. 
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Table A.16: Target growth rates, actual growth rates and employment absorption by demographic and 
educational attainment characteristics, OHS 1995 vs. QLFS 2011Q4 
 Target Growth Rate Actual Growth Rate Employment 
Absorption Rate 
Age 
 
18-24years 
 
76.07% 17.85% 23.47% 
25-29years 73.37% 39.44% 53.76% 
30-34years 59.21% 36.63% 61.87% 
35-44years 52.70% 37.09% 70.37% 
45-54years 73.04% 60.71% 83.12% 
55-65years 92.18% 86.75% 94.11% 
18-29years 74.48% 30.55% 41.01% 
30-65years 62.86% 47.22% 75.12% 
Race 
Black 136.08% 66.28% 48.71% 
Coloured 6.02% -9.16% -152.24% 
Indian -5.80% -3.15% 54.23% 
White -24.66% -30.05% 121.86% 
Gender 
Male 66.30% 28.01% 42.24% 
Female 86.49% 34.28% 39.63% 
Province 
Western Cape 34.40% 8.67% 25.19% 
Eastern Cape 125.51% 69.84% 55.65% 
Northern Cape 54.97% 19.57% 35.60% 
Free State 57.20% -2.13% -3.72% 
KwaZulu-Natal 69.00% 46.51% 67.40% 
North-West -6.39% -22.15% 346.63% 
Gauteng 82.88% 24.26% 29.27% 
Mpumalanga 159.67% 70.98% 44.45% 
Limpopo 182.11% 114.61% 62.93% 
Highest educational attainment 
No schooling -100.75% -79.71% 79.12% 
Incomplete primary -80.35% -60.33% 75.08% 
Incomplete secondary 113.61% 50.23% 44.21% 
Matric 123.24% 58.97% 47.85% 
Matric + 
Certificate/Diploma 
64.06% 
29.47% 46.01% 
Degree 59.29% 40.27% 67.92% 
Source: Own calculation using OHS 1995 and QLFS 2011Q4 
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Appendix B: South Africa’s performances in selected international pupil reading, 
mathematics and science tests 
 
Figure B.1: TIMSS 2003 average pupil Grade 8 Science score by participating country 
 
Source: Martin, Mullis, Gonzalez, Chrostowski (2004: 44-46) 
 
Figure B.2: TIMSS 2003 average pupil Grade 8 Mathematics score by participating country 
Data source: Martin, Mullis, Gonzalez, Chrostowski (2004: 42-44) 
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Figure B.3: PIRLS 2006 average pupil Grade 4 reading score by participating country 
Data source: Mullis, Martin, Kennedy, Foy (2007: 44)  
 
Figure B.4: SACMEQ II average pupil Grade 6 Mathematics score by participating country 
 
Source: Own calculations using SACMEQ II data. 
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